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1 Introduction
By lowering the relative cost of more environmentally sound technologies,
technology policy can increase incentives for countries to comply with inter-
national climate obligations.
IPCC (2014:1035)
An international environmental treaty must address two major challenges to succeed.
First, in the absence of international enforcement bodies, it must be self-enforcing. That
is, countries will comply with the treaty in order to motivate other countries to do so
in the future.1 This motivation, however, may not always be sufficiently strong. For
example, for many years it was clear that Canada would not meet its commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol and in 2011, it simply withdrew.
The second challenge is to develop new and environmentally friendly technology. The
importance of new green technology is recognized in climate treaties, but traditionally
they have not quantified the extent to which countries are required to invest in these
technologies.2 Instead, negotiators focus on quantifying emissions or abatements and
leave the investment decision to individual countries. Nevertheless, some countries do
invest heavily in green technologies. The European Union has set itself the goal that
20 percent of its energy will come from renewable sources by 2020 and 27 percent by
2030. China is an even larger investor in renewable energy and has invested heavily in
wind energy and solar technology.3 Other countries have instead invested in so-called
“brown” technology: Canada, for example, has developed its capacity to extract oil from
unconventional sources, such as tar sands, and it “risks being left behind as green energy
takes off ” (The Globe and Mail, September 21, 2009).
The interaction between the two challenges is poorly understood by both economists
and policy makers. To understand how treaties can address these two challenges and
how they are related, a model is needed that allows technology investment decisions
and emission decisions to be made repeatedly. Since the treaty must be self-enforcing,
strategies must constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE).
1The need for self-enforcement is recognized by the IPCC (2014:1015): “From a rationalist perspective,
compliance will occur if the discounted net benefits from cooperation (including direct climate benefits,
co-benefits, reputation, transfers, and other elements) exceed the discounted net benefits of defection.”
2Chapter 16 of the Stern Review (2007) identified technology-based schemes as an indispensable
strategy for tackling climate change. However, article 114 of the 2010 Cancun Agreement, confirmed
in Durban in 2011, states that “technology needs must be nationally determined, based on national
circumstance and priorities.” In contrast and as discussed in Section 9, some of the pledges following the
2015 Paris Agreement relate to technology.
3For more details on the European Union’s climate and energy policy strategy, see
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030, and for that of China, see thediplomat.com/2014/11/in-
new-plan-china-eyes-2020-energy-cap/.
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There is no such theory in the literature and therefore many important questions are
left unaddressed. First, what characterizes the “best” SPE, i.e., the best self-enforcing
treaty? While folk theorems have emphasized that even the first best can be sustained
if the players are sufficiently patient, what distortions occur if they are not? How can
technologies be used strategically to ensure that the treaty is self-enforcing? Which types
of countries ought to invest the most and in what kinds of technologies?
To address these questions, we present a repeated extensive-form game, in which
countries can in each period invest in technology before deciding on emission levels.
In the simplest version of the model, all decisions are observable and investments are
self-investments, i.e., there are no technological spillovers. Consequently, equilibrium
investments would have been first best if the countries had committed to the emission
levels. The first best can also be achieved if the discount factor is sufficiently high, in
line with standard folk theorems. For smaller discount factors, however, the best SPE
requires countries to strategically distort their investment decisions in order to reduce the
temptation to pollute more rather than less. We show that the distortions take the form
of overinvestment in the case of “green” technologies, i.e., renewable energy or abatement
technologies that can substitute for pollution. In the case of “brown” technologies, such as
drilling technologies and other infrastructure investments that are strategic complements
to fossil fuel consumption, investments must instead be less than the first-best amount
in order to satisfy the compliance constraint. Our most controversial result states that
countries should also be required to invest less than the first-best amount in the case of
adaptation technologies, i.e., technology that reduces environmental harm in a country.
The comparative statics offer important policy implications. Of course, it is harder to
motivate compliance if the discount factor is low or the environmental harm is on a small
scale. This is also true when a small number of countries participate in the agreement,
or when investment costs are high in the case of green technology or low in the case
of brown or adaptation technologies. In these circumstances, the best SPE requires
countries to invest more when the technology is green, and less when it is brown or when
it is adaptation technology. If countries are heterogeneous, the countries that are most
reluctant to cooperate because, for example, they face less environmental harm, are the
most tempted to free ride. Thus, for compliance to be credible, such countries must invest
the most in green technologies or the least in adaptation and brown technologies. This
advice contrasts with the typical presumption that reluctant countries should be allowed
to contribute less in order to satisfy their participation constraint. While incentives to
participate require that a country’s net gain from cooperating be positive, incentives to
comply with emissions also require that this net gain outweigh the positive benefit of free
riding for one period, before the defection is observed. The compliance constraint at the
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emission stage is therefore harder to satisfy than the participation constraint is.
Simplicity and tractability are two advantages of our baseline model. Our main results
are derived in a pedagogical way with binary emission levels, while ignoring investment
in technology portfolios, technological spillovers, imperfect monitoring, and policy in-
struments such as emission taxes or investment subsidies. However, when the model
is extended to take into account these complicating factors, we obtain a deeper under-
standing of the interplay between agreements and technology. We show that our insight
extends to the situation in which a country can invest in a portfolio of different types
of technologies. Technological spillovers make it harder to design self-enforcing treaties
if countries are similar; however, spillovers are necessary to facilitate technology trans-
fers if countries are heterogeneous. When emissions are difficult to monitor, strategic
investments in technologies can reduce the punishment or the risk that punishments are
triggered by mistake, while still ensuring that countries are motivated to comply. The
results hold with continuous emission levels and if national governments regulate firms’
emissions and technology investments through taxes and subsidies. In this case, we show
that optimal environmental regulation includes both emission taxes and investment sub-
sidies if and only if the discount factor is small. Since these extensions are motivated by
challenges faced by climate change agreements, the results are highly policy relevant.
Literature. Our investigation of bottom-up cooperation complements the top-down
(mechanism-design) approach by, for example, Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2016).
Thus, our paper fills a gap between the literature on environmental economics and that
on repeated games. As mentioned, it is widely accepted that international agreements
must be self-enforcing.4 Thus, we draw heavily on the repeated games literature, although
much of this literature has been concerned with folk theorems and conditions under which
the first best can be sustained if only the players are sufficiently patient (see, e.g., Ivaldi
et al., 2003; Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). In the context of international agreements,
however, such a large discount factor is unrealistic and the gains from cooperation may
depend on various national policies. We therefore extend the standard repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game in two main respects: (i) we allow players to invest in technologies in each
period, and (ii) we investigate the second-best equilibrium when the discount factor is so
small that the folk theorem does not hold.5
Our paper is of course not the first to study self-enforcing environmental agreements.
4As Downs and Jones (2002:S95) observed, “a growing number of international relations theorists and
international lawyers have begun to argue that states’ reputational concerns are actually the principal
mechanism for maintaining a high level of treaty compliance.”
5Note that neither of the two extensions would be interesting on its own, since with high discount
factors, the folk theorem always holds, even in a model with technology. Without technology and with
small discount factors, voluntary cooperation cannot be enforced in the repeated public good game.
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In previous papers, such as Barrett (1994; 2005) and Dutta and Radner (2004; 2006),
technology investments are either not permitted or chosen as a corner solution at the
beginning of the game. Our contribution is to emphasize exactly how technological in-
vestments should (and will) be taken advantage of in the best self-enforcing agreement.
There is an emerging literature that examines the relationship between technology
investments and international environmental cooperation. However, it focuses either on
the harmful effects of technology investments on a country’s bargaining position in the
future, when new commitments are to be negotiated (see, e.g., Buchholz and Konrad,
1994; Beccherle and Tirole, 2011; Harstad, 2012, 2016a; Helm and Schmidt, 2015) or
on a country’s incentive to invest in the presence of positive international externalities
(see, e.g., Barrett, 2006; de Coninck et al., 2008; Golombek and Hoel, 2005; Hoel and de
Zeeuw, 2010). Our contribution to this literature is to stress how technology influences
a country’s incentives to comply with emission abatements.
The structure of our model is similar to the one of Harstad (2012; 2016a) and
Battaglini and Harstad (2016), where countries pollute and invest in green technologies
in every period. These papers, however, assume contractible emission levels and study
Markov-perfect equilibria, while we focus on self-enforcing agreements and subgame-
perfect equilibria. This approach leads to a new strategic effect of technology—namely
that technology should be chosen so as to make future cooperation credible.
Theoretically, the paper is related to the industrial organization literature, in which
strategic investments can deter entry (see, e.g., Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1984) or reduce production costs and therefore improve the competitive position
vis-a`-vis rivals (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1983; Spence, 1984; d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988; Leahy and Neary, 1997).6 These papers have, however, focused on static
models and have ignored the influence of investments on the sustainability of cooperation.7
More closely related is the literature on the influence of capacity constraints on the
sustainability of tacit collusion. In examining this question, Brock and Scheinkman (1985)
treated the capacity constraints as exogenous, while Benoit and Krishna (1987) allowed
firms to collude on capacity investments as well as on price. When capacity investments
6Papers on investment as entry deterrence show that incumbent firms may use strategic investment
as a credible threat, since it modifies the incumbent’s ex post reaction function. Papers on cost-reducing
R&D show that firms can invest strategically in R&D before the associated output is produced, if they
anticipate that a lower marginal cost leads to a higher market share.
7Martin (1995) and Cabral (2000) contributed to the analysis of the role of strategic investment, by
considering an infinite-period duopoly industry in which firms make R&D decisions as well as product
market decisions. Both papers showed that R&D investments may encourage firms to tacitly collude on
output, resulting in a welfare loss. However, the mechanism by which collusion is sustained occurs is
very different from our mechanism, since Martin (1995) assumes that firms commit themselves to the
joint profit-maximizing level of R&D, while Cabral (2000) assumes that R&D investments are hidden
and therefore cannot be part of the agreement.
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are irreversible, firms overinvest in order to make retaliation harsh and credible; but this
effect vanishes when investments are reversible, since firms can always adjust the retalia-
tion capacity later.8 Our mechanism differs in that overinvestment in green technology or
underinvestment in adaptation and brown technologies is necessary along the equilibrium
path in order to undermine the short-run gain from deviation in the cooperative phase.
This result holds even when investment decisions are fully reversible and is reinforced
when they are not.
While similar mechanisms have fruitfully been applied in the relational contracting
literature,9 we are the first to investigate the influence of investments on the sustainabil-
ity of environmental agreements.10 The paper contributes to the more applied theory
literature in a number of ways: (i) by predicting which types of players will invest in
which types of technologies; (ii) by showing that technology spillovers can be beneficial
or harmful for the sustainability of an agreement—depending on whether the players are
similar or different; (iii) by showing that strategic investments influence not only whether
cooperation is sustainable, but also the optimal length and likelihood of punishments;
(iv) by deriving the combination of taxes and subsidies that is ideal, even in the absence
of technological spillovers.
The paper is organized as follows. The baseline model is presented in Section 2 and
analyzed in Section 3. To shed further light on optimal climate change policy, we then
allow for multiple types of technology investments simultaneously (Section 4), technolog-
ical spillovers and transfers (Section 5), imperfect monitoring (Section 6), private sector
decision making in investment and continuous emissions levels (Section 7), and finally we
show how the model can be reformulated to account for the accumulation of pollution
and technology (Section 8). Section 9 concludes and the Appendix contains all proofs.
8While Davidson and Deneckere (1990) do not allow firms to collude in capacity, they do allow them
to collude on price. Like Benoit and Krishna (1987), they also show that excess capacity is present
in all equilibria. The impact of asymmetry in capacity on self-enforcing collusion is instead analyzed
by Lambson (1994) and Compte et al. (2002), who investigate how asymmetry in capacity influences
whether collusion is self-enforcing. They conclude that, depending on parameters, asymmetric capacities
may either encourage or discourage collusion.
9The idea that technology investments can ex post relax the compliance constraint on individual
contributions to a public good is also present in the relational contracting literature (see, e.g., Ramey and
Watson, 1997; Halac, 2015). However, these papers study the impact of up-front investment by one party
on the value of a relation between two parties and focus on the harmful effects of the holdup problem.
Our model differs from theirs in that all countries invest and the investments are repeated. Repeated
maintenance investments in the public good are allowed in Halonen and Pafilis (2018). However, in that
paper, it is the ownership structure that is chosen to mitigate the temptation to free ride on individual
contributions.
10Building on our work, Kerr et al. (2018) study how the timing of transfers can facilitate compliance
in a dynamic climate change game. Harstad (2016b) examines how green/brown technologies can be used
as commitment devices for hyperbolic decision makers. However, in that paper, there is no prisoner’s
dilemma or self-enforcing treaties. Lancia and Russo (2016) study how agents exert effort strategically
in order to signal their willingness to cooperate in a stochastic overlapping-generations model.
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2 A Model of Compliance Technology
The model we construct is motivated by global environmental problems such as climate
change. Since no world government can force countries to cooperate in solving such
problems, the temptation to free ride must be mitigated. The possibility of free riding
is a result of the fact that if a country increases its emissions, other countries will not
retaliate immediately because, for example, emissions are observed with a lag. To capture
this lag, we let time t ∈ {1, ...,∞} be discrete and δ ∈ (0, 1) be the common discount
factor between periods.
Analogously, there is also a lag between the decision to invest in a technology and
the point at which it begins to contribute to consumption. This lag leads us to use an
extensive-form stage game, in which each country invests in technology before deciding
on how much to consume or pollute. Furthermore, the infinite time horizon relevant for
climate change implies that it is unrealistic to assume that a country can invest in the
capacity to produce renewable energy once and for all, without later having to invest
in maintenance. To capture this effect, we start out by assuming that technology fully
depreciates, so that countries must invest in every single period. We also at first abstract
from technological spillovers since, in contrast to environmental externalities, technolog-
ical spillovers may be relatively small when the technology is a country’s capacity to
produce renewable energy.
There are n ≥ 2 players in the game, indexed by i or j ∈ N ≡ {1, ..., n}. In each stage
game, there is an emission stage in which countries simultaneously make a binary decision
gi ∈
{
g, g
}
between emitting less, i.e., gi = g, or more, i.e., gi = g > g. Whenever it is
not confusing, we omit the subscripts denoting time.
Let the benefit bi (gi, ri) be an increasing function of country i’s emissions gi. The
environmental cost from global emissions is hic (ri)
∑
j∈N gj, where parameter hi measures
country-specific environmental harm. The assumption that this cost is linear in emissions
is simplifying, common, and relatively reasonable.11 The variable ri ∈ R+ is meant
to capture the fact that a country’s benefit and its environmental cost depend on the
country’s technology, although ri can in fact be any variable that influences the benefit
and cost of emissions. For simplicity, we assume that bi (gi, ri) is increasing and concave
in ri and c (ri) is decreasing and convex in ri. We also assume that the game at the
emission stage is a prisoner’s dilemma, irrespective of the level of ri, as follows:
11As explained by Golosov et al. (2014:78): “Linearity is arguably not too extreme a simplification,
since the composition of a concave S-to-temperature mapping with a convex temperature-to-damage func-
tion may be close to linear.” They also write (p. 67): “The composition implied by Nordhaus’s formulation
is first concave, then convex; our function is approximately linear over this range. Overall, the two curves
are quite close.”
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Assumption 1 For each i ∈ N and ri ∈ R+,
(i) bi(g, ri)− hic (ri) g < bi(g, ri)− hic (ri) g;
(ii) bi(g, ri)− hic (ri)ng > bi(g, ri)− hic (ri)ng.
In words, country i benefits from emitting more for any fixed emission from other coun-
tries, but every country would be better off if everyone emitted less. Hereafter, and
unless otherwise specified, we use subscripts to denote derivatives. Moreover, we abuse
the notation by defining b′′i,gr (ri) ≡ (b′i,r (g, ri) − b′i,r(g, ri))/(g − g), which captures how
the benefit of emitting more rather than less varies with the level of technology.
To illustrate the relevance of technology, we will occasionally refer to the following
special types:
Definition 1 For each ri ∈ R+,
(A) Adaptation technology is characterized by b′′i,gr (ri) = 0 and c
′
r (ri) < 0;
(B) Brown technology is characterized by b′′i,gr (ri) > 0 and c
′
r (ri) = 0;
(C) Clean technology is characterized by b′′i,gr (ri) < 0 and c
′
r (ri) = 0.
An adaptation technology is one that enables a country to adapt to a warmer or
more volatile climate. Such technologies include agricultural reforms or more robust
infrastructure and may in addition capture the effects of some geo-engineering practices
that have strictly local effects. Adaptation technology is therefore complementary to
polluting, since it reduces the environmental cost of emissions, i.e., c′r (ri) < 0. Brown
technology can be interpreted as drilling technology, infrastructure that is beneficial in the
extraction or consumption of fossil fuel, or some other technology that is complementary
to fossil fuel consumption. The complementarity is captured by b′′i,gr (ri) > 0. In fact, most
investments made in polluting industries are brown, according to our definition. Clean
technology, in contrast, is a strategic substitute for fossil fuel and reduces the marginal
value of emitting another unit of pollution. This is the case for abatement technology
or renewable energy sources, for example. Thus, b′′i,gr (ri) < 0 for clean technologies. Of
course, both brown and clean technologies may be beneficial in that b′i,r (gi, ri) > 0.
We endogenize the technology level by permitting an investment stage, in each period,
during which countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide on investment, be-
fore they decide on whether to emit less or more. As already noted, the sequential timing
follows directly from the fact that there is a minimum length of time l ∈ (0, 1) between the
investment decision and the time at which the technology is operational. The lag implies
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that if the actual marginal investment cost is, say, k̂i > 0, then its present discounted
value, evaluated at the time of the emission, is ki ≡ δlk̂i. With this reformulation, we
do not need to explicitly discount between the two stages within the same period. Note
that assuming a linear investment cost is without loss of generality, since ri can enter a
country’s benefit function in arbitrary ways.12 Country i’s per-period utility can then be
written as:
ui = bi (gi, ri)− hic (ri)
∑
j∈N
gj − kiri.
Benchmarks. Before analyzing self-enforcing agreements, we examine two polar cases in
which emissions and investments are chosen at every decision stage either non-cooperatively
by each individual country or by a planner with full enforcement power.
Consider first non-cooperative investments. Suppose that each country is expected
to pollute at the same level, that is, gi = g for each i. For every g, country i’s optimal
investment level ri (g) is obtained by solving the following first-order condition:
b′i,r (g, ri)− hic′r (ri)ng − ki = 0, (1)
while the second-order condition holds trivially.
At the emission stage, Assumption 1 implies that gi = g is a dominant strategy for
every country. Thus, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the stage
game, that is, (gi, ri) = (g, ri (g)). Using terminology from the literature on environmental
agreements, we refer to this equilibrium as the business-as-usual (BAU) equilibrium and
label it with the superscript bau. Note that BAU also coincides with the worst SPE, that
is, the min-max payoff of the stage game, since every country is always guaranteed at
least that utility level, i.e., ubaui ≡ bi
(
g, rbaui
)− hic (rbaui )ng − kirbaui with rbaui ≡ ri (g).
The first-best outcome is characterized by (gi, ri) = (g, ri(g)) for each i and coin-
cides with the case in which a benevolent planner makes all its decisions in order to
maximize the sum of countries’ utilities. It follows that the first-best level of utility is
u∗i ≡ bi
(
g, r∗i
)− hic (r∗i )ng− kir∗i > ubaui with r∗i ≡ ri (g). Since the first-best investment
level also follows from condition (1), we can state the following preliminary result:
Proposition 0 If all countries commit to the emission level gi = g, every non-cooperative
investment is first best, i.e., r∗i .
Proposition 0 provides support for the presumption that it is not necessary to negoti-
ate investments in addition to negotiating emissions. Under a commitment to gi = g, each
12If the investment cost were a different function κi (ri), we could simply define b˜i (gi, κi (ri)) ≡
bi (gi, ri) and c˜ (κi (ri)) ≡ c (ri), treat κi (ri) as the decision variable, and then proceed as we do in
the paper.
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country’s investment would be socially optimal and the first best would be sustainable
as an SPE. In what follows, we consider the more realistic scenario in which countries
cannot commit to low emission levels.
3 Self-enforcing Agreements
When actions are observable, an international environmental agreement can specify every
country’s levels of emission and investment at every point in time. For such an agreement
to be self-enforcing, the decisions must constitute an SPE. As in many dynamic games
with an infinite time horizon, there are multiple SPEs. When countries can communicate
and negotiate at the outset, it may be reasonable to assume that they will coordinate on
a Pareto-optimal SPE. Since the game is a prisoner’s dilemma at the emission stage, we
are especially interested in SPEs in which n countries emit less on the equilibrium path,
i.e., in which gi,t = g for each i ∈ N and any t ≥ 1.
Note that we do not require that all countries “in the world” emit less. Rather,
we can let N refer to the set of countries emitting less under the agreement. If there
exist other countries that always emit more, they will be irrelevant to the game and the
equilibrium subsequently analyzed, since the emissions of these other countries are not
payoff relevant when the environmental harm is linear in the sum of emissions. When
there is a unique Pareto-optimal SPE outcome among the n countries emitting less, we
refer to an equilibrium that supports it as a best equilibrium.
Definition 2 An equilibrium is referred to as “best” if and only if it supports the unique
Pareto-optimal SPE outcome involving gi,t = g ∀i ∈ N and t ≥ 1 on the equilibrium path.
The best equilibrium must also specify the consequences if a country fails to emit less.
Since this never occurs on the equilibrium path, there is no loss in assuming that the
countries would respond by playing the worst SPE, i.e., BAU, forever. The observation
that punishments are never observed in equilibrium also implies that, in a setting with a
common discount factor, the best equilibrium outcome must be stationary, i.e., it supports
ri,t = ri for every t ≥ 1 (Abreu, 1988). Therefore, we can omit the t subscripts for brevity.
The normalized (to one period) continuation value when complying with the best SPE is
ui (ri) ≡ bi
(
g, ri
)− hic (ri)ng − kiri.
Deviations can occur during either the investment stage or the emission stage. At
the investment stage, a country will compare the continuation value it receives from
complying with the SPE by investing in the ri with the maximal continuation value it can
obtain by deviating. Since deviating at the investment stage implies that every country
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will emit more starting from that period, the compliance constraint at the investment
stage is as follows:
ui (ri)
1− δ ≥ maxri bi (g, ri)− hic (ri)ng − kiri +
δubaui
1− δ . (CC
r
i )
The right-hand side of constraint (CCri ) is maximized when ri = r
bau
i , implying that the
compliance constraint at the investment stage simplifies to ui (ri) ≥ ubaui , which actually
coincides with the participation constraint. If a country deviates at the investment stage,
the penalty is imposed before the country can benefit from free riding on emissions. Thus,
the temptation to free ride at the investment stage is weak since a country does not care
about other countries’ investment levels per se, but only about its own emission levels.
At the emission stage, the investment cost in the current period is sunk and the
compliance constraint becomes:
ui (ri)
1− δ ≥ bi (g, ri)− hic (ri) (g + (n− 1) g)− kiri +
δubaui
1− δ . (CC
g
i )
As δ tends to one, (CCgi ) approaches (CC
r
i ). For any δ < 1, however, (CC
g
i ) is harder
to satisfy than (CCri ) because of the free-riding incentive at the emission stage. It is not
sufficient that the best equilibrium be better than BAU. In addition, the discount factor
must be large or the temptation to free ride on emissions must be small. For notational
convenience, we rewrite constraint (CCgi ) as follows:
∆i (ri, δ) ≡ ui (ri)− ubaui −
1− δ
δ
(g − g)ψi (ri) ≥ 0, where
ψi (ri) ≡
bi (g, ri)− bi(g, ri)
g − g − hic (ri)
relates to the one-period benefit from free riding on emissions, which is positive according
to Assumption 1. For every i, the equation ∆i (ri, δ) = 0 identifies a threshold discount
factor δi (ri) that depends on the level ri. Let δi be defined as the level of δ that solves
∆i (r
∗
i , δ) = 0. It follows that, if δ ≥ maxi δi, every (CCgi ) holds (even) for ri = r∗i
and the best equilibrium is simply the first best. There is also a lower bound on the
discount factor, denoted by δi, such that if δ < δi, there is no ri that satisfies both (CC
g
i )
and (CCri ). In this case, there does not exist any ri such that country i will emit less.
When δ ∈ [δ, δi), with δ ≡ maxi δi, country i is willing to participate in the climate
agreement, but compliance with less emissions is not satisfied if ri = r
∗
i . To ensure that
the compliance constraint at the emission stage is satisfied, the temptation to free ride
must be reduced by ensuring that ri is such that δi (ri) ≤ δ. This requires that ri > r∗i if
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δ′i,r (r
∗
i ) < 0, and ri < r
∗
i if δ
′
i,r (r
∗
i ) > 0. It is straightforward to verify that:
δ′i,r (r
∗
i ) < 0 if b
′′
i,gr (r
∗
i ) < hic
′
r (r
∗
i ) ; (Gi)
δ′i,r (r
∗
i ) > 0 if b
′′
i,gr (r
∗
i ) > hic
′
r (r
∗
i ) . (NGi)
Condition (Gi) stands for “green” technology and implies that making more investments
relaxes the compliance constraint at the emission stage by reducing the threshold δi (ri).
Clearly, this condition is satisfied in, for example, the case of clean technology as defined
in Definition 1, since additional investment reduces the gain from emitting more rather
than less. Condition (NGi) stands for “non-green” technologies and implies that making
less investments relaxes the compliance constraint. Adaptation and brown technologies
are special cases in which this condition holds. For these types of technologies, the benefit
of emitting more is reduced if there is less investment in technology. When the benefit of
emitting more is reduced, the compliance constraint (CCgi ) is relaxed and is satisfied for
a larger set of discount factors. Since the results will depend on these two conditions, we
henceforth will relate to green and non-green technologies, while occasionally discussing
the relevant implications of the results for the specific types of technologies described in
Definition 1.
Let ri (δ) be the level of ri that maximizes ui (ri) subject to ∆i (ri, δ) ≥ 0. The
following proposition specifies the conditions under which the best equilibrium exists and
characterizes the optimal distortion of the investment in technology from the first-best
level.
Proposition 1 There exists a best equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ. For each i ∈ N , it
supports ri = r
∗
i when δ ≥ δi. Otherwise,
(i) ri = ri (δ) > r
∗
i if technology is green;
(ii) ri = ri (δ) < r
∗
i if technology is non-green. Furthermore, |ri (δ)− r∗i | is decreasing
in δ.
The result that the first best is achievable when the discount factor is sufficiently large
is standard in the literature on repeated games.13 Thus, the contribution of Proposition 1
is to characterize the distortions that must occur if the discount factor is small. When the
discount factor is so small that the first best cannot be achieved, countries are motivated
to comply with an agreement and emit less only if they have previously invested more if
technology is green or less if technology is non-green. Investment levels are required to
13Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1995) show that Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)’s folk theorem can be
generalized to repeated extensive-form games in order to account for subgame perfection within periods.
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increasingly differ from the first-best level when δ declines from the level δi in order to
reduce the temptation to deviate from the equilibrium.14
For the special types of technologies described in Definition 1, the following result
holds:
Corollary 1 In the best equilibrium and relative to the first best, countries will:
(A) Underinvest in the case of adaptation technology;
(B) Underinvest in the case of brown technology;
(C) Overinvest in the case of clean technology.
3.1 Comparative Statics
The compliance constraints are not functions of only technology, but also depend on other
parameters of the model. In this section, we consider the effect on investments in each
type of technology of a change in these parameters. Compliance is particularly difficult
to motivate if the cost of reverting to BAU is small, which holds true when there are
few countries, i.e., when n is small, or when the environmental harm is small, i.e., when
hi is small. To satisfy the compliance constraint in these situations, it is necessary that
country i invest more in clean technology, and less in brown technology or adaptation
technology. The comparative statics are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose δ ∈ [δ, δi) and consider the best equilibrium:
(i) If hi or n increases, ri decreases in the case of clean technology, increases in the
case of brown technology, and, provided that c (ri) > (c
′
r (ri))
2 /c′′rr (ri), increases in
the case of adaptation technology;15
(ii) If ki increases, ri increases regardless of the type of technology.
A surprising result is that investment in any type of technology will increase with
the cost of investment ki. To see this, recall that ri < r
bau
i for adaptation and brown
14Note that it is not necessary to require that investment be sufficiently small or sufficiently large that
emitting less becomes a dominant strategy; it is sufficient to ensure that the benefit of emitting more be
smaller (though still positive) than the present discounted value of continuing cooperation. Requiring
countries to invest at a level that is inefficient, conditional on the emission levels, must be part of the
self-enforcing agreement, in the same way that low emission levels are, namely any deviation leads to
BAU forever.
15If this condition is violated, investing in adaptation technology is so productive that if n or hi
increases, country i’s environmental cost hic (ri)ng actually declines when the changes induce the country
to invest more in adaptation technology, which seems unrealistic.
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technologies. For those technologies, a larger ki reduces the value of BAU compared to
the value of cooperating, i.e., ui (ri)−ubaui increases, and makes the compliance constraint
easier to satisfy at the emission stage. Thus, when ki increases, ri can increase toward
r∗i without violating (CC
g
i ). For clean technology, we have ri > r
bau
i , so that a larger ki
reduces the value of cooperating relative to the value of BAU. In that case, the compliance
constraint becomes harder to satisfy when ki increases and country i must invest even
more to satisfy (CCgi ).
Since countries are heterogeneous, the comparative statics are country specific. We
can therefore differentiate between countries that are the most reluctant to cooperate
from those that are the least. If country i has a lower level of environmental harm than
country j, or has a higher investment cost in the case of clean technology or has a smaller
investment cost in the case of brown or adaptation technology, then δi > δj, and we can
say that i is more reluctant than j. Since the most reluctant countries are tempted to
emit more, it is more likely that their compliance constraints bind, i.e., δ < δi, and that
they must invest strategically to make compliance credible.
The result that countries which benefit less from cooperation ought to make greater
sacrifices is in stark contrast to the idea that countries should contribute according to their
ability and their responsibility for pollution and that they must be given a better deal to
motivate cooperation. It is true, of course, that a reluctant country has a participation
constraint, i.e., ui (r) ≥ ubaui , which is more difficult to satisfy than are the constraints
for other countries. However, as already shown, the compliance constraint (CCgi ) is more
difficult to satisfy than the participation constraint (CCri ). Although each country’s
benefit from cooperating, relative to BAU, must certainly be positive, it must also be
larger than the benefit from free riding for one period, before the deviation is detected.
3.2 Policy-relevant Extensions
The baseline model relies on a number of strong assumptions. While they have allowed
us to present key results in a pedagogical way, the following five sections make the model
more realistic and policy relevant. The extensions make it possible to investigate the
robustness of the results and also to obtain a deeper understanding of the relationship
between technology and compliance. The reader is free to jump directly to the extension
of interest, since they are independent and each is based on the baseline model.
While the baseline model considered only a single stock of technology, Section 4 allows
countries to invest in a technology portfolio and shows how the elasticity of substitution
between clean and brown technologies influences investment distortions. Section 5 intro-
duces technological spillovers and shows when they motivate compliance by facilitating
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technological transfers from, for example, the North to the South. Section 6 acknowl-
edges that, in practice, emission levels are imperfectly monitored. As a result, strategic
investments in technology can reduce the duration or the likelihood of punishment with-
out violating the compliance constraint. In Section 7, the emission level is non-binary
and emissions, as well as investments, are decided on by the private sector. While the
first-best investment subsidy is zero, we derive formulae for the subsidies needed when the
emission tax must be lowered to motivate compliance. Section 8 shows why the results
continue to hold when both pollution and technology levels accumulate over time.
4 Technology Portfolios
We have so far assumed that a country can invest in only one technology at a time,
although we have been flexible regarding what type of technology that might be. In
reality, however, technologies of different types are simultaneously available and each
country invests in a technology portfolio. When the model allows for this, we can ask
how different countries will invest in various types of technologies and when motivating
compliance requires a transition from one type of technology to another.
This section extends the baseline model by permitting countries to invest in a tech-
nology portfolio ri ≡ (rσi )σ∈{A,B,C} ∈ R3+, which includes all three types of technology
appearing in Definition 1. The superscript σ = A will denote adaptation technology,
σ = B will denote brown technology, and σ = C will denote clean technology. We allow
the cost of investment to vary across technologies. When all countries emit at a low level,
country i’s per-period utility is given by:
ui (ri) ≡ bi(g, rBi , rCi )− hic
(
rAi
)
ng −
∑
σ∈{A,B,C}
kσi r
σ
i .
Following the earlier notation, we define b′′i,gσ
(
rBi , r
C
i
) ≡ (b′i,σ (g, rBi , rCi )−b′i,σ(g, rBi , rCi ))/(g−
g) for every σ ∈ {B,C}, where b′i,σ(g, rBi , rCi ) denotes the derivatives with respect to rσi .
Depending on which type of technology has the strongest impact on the benefit from
emitting more rather than less, two alternative scenarios emerge, as embodied in the
following relations: (
b′′i,gB(·)
)2∣∣b′′i,BB(·)∣∣ <
(
b′′i,gC(·)
)2∣∣b′′i,CC(·)∣∣ , (C-Di)(
b′′i,gB(·)
)2∣∣b′′i,BB(·)∣∣ >
(
b′′i,gC(·)
)2∣∣b′′i,CC(·)∣∣ . (B-Di)
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Condition (C-Di) stands for “clean dominance” and holds when the benefit from emitting
more is more sensitive to the level of rCi than to the level of r
B
i . This condition is likely to
hold in a country which has a specialized or targeted type of clean technology. In contrast,
condition (B-Di) stands for “brown dominance” and implies that it is the country’s brown
technology that is dominant in determining the country’s benefit from polluting. This
condition may hold for countries in which fossil-fuel-intensive industries are prevalent.
Since both brown and clean technologies enter the benefit function, they can be inter-
dependent. Thus, they are technological substitutes if b′′i,BC
(
g, rBi , r
C
i
)
< 0 and comple-
ments otherwise. To facilitate exposition, we assume that (b′′i,BC(·))2 < b′′i,BB(·)b′′i,CC(·).16
To illustrate the results, we will occasionally distinguish between weak and strong com-
plementarity:
Definition 3 Let ηC-Di (·) ≡ b′′i,CC(·)b′′i,gB(·)/b′′i,gC(·) and ηB-Di (·) ≡ b′′i,BB(·)b′′i,gC(·)/b′′i,gB(·).
Under condition ι ∈ {C-Di,B-Di}, rBi and rCi are:
(i) strong complements if b′′i,BC (·) > ηιi (·);
(ii) weak complements if b′′i,BC (·) ∈ (0, ηιi (·)].
While all the cases are theoretically possible, each of them may be more or less realistic
depending on the importance of specific industries.17
The compliance constraints at the investment and emission stages are equivalent to
the earlier constraints (CCri ) and (CC
g
i ) with ri replaced by ri. Before letting each coun-
try determine the entire vector of technologies, we start out by considering the situation
in which some technologies are subject to exogenous change, such as (unintended) tech-
nological progress.
Proposition 3 Suppose (CCgi ) binds. For (CC
g
i ) to continue to hold:
(i) If either rAi or r
B
i increases, then r
C
i also does;
(ii) If either rAi increases or r
C
i decreases, then r
B
i decreases;
(iii) If either rBi increases or r
C
i decreases, then r
A
i decreases.
16This restriction guarantees the existence of an interior solution but it is not essential to obtaining
the result.
17For example, one could argue that the different types of technology for the production of electricity
(such as clean and brown) are complements. Since it is costly to store electricity produced from solar
and wind power, and because electricity production from these sources varies considerably from hour to
hour, they must be complemented by traditional sources in order to ensure a constant flow of electricity.
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Different types of technologies affect the compliance constraint at the emission stage
in different ways. If the level of one type of technology varies exogenously, the level of
the other technologies must be adjusted so that compliance with emission levels can be
satisfied. With brown technological progress, for example, there is greater temptation to
emit more, and this can be dampened by investing either more in clean technology or
less in adaptation technology.
We now consider the situation in which all investment levels are endogenously deter-
mined. Depending on the type of interdependence between the different technologies, the
following proposition characterizes, for every country, the distortions of the technology
portfolio in the best SPE, relative to the first-best level r∗i ≡ (rσ∗i )σ∈{A,B,C}. As in the
baseline model, the upper bound δi is the level of δ that satisfies (CC
g
i ) with equality
when all technology levels are first best, while the lower bound δ is the maximal δ, such
that if δ < δ, there is no investment vector that can satisfy (CCgi ) and (CC
r
i ) for every
country.
Proposition 4 There exists a best equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ. For each i ∈ N , it
supports ri = r
∗
i when δ ≥ δi. Otherwise, rAi < rA∗i and
(i) rBi < r
B∗
i and r
C
i > r
C∗
i when r
B
i and r
C
i are substitutes or weak complements;
(ii) rBi > r
B∗
i and r
C
i > r
C∗
i under (C-Di) and r
B
i < r
B∗
i and r
C
i < r
C∗
i under (B-Di),
when rBi and r
C
i are strong complements.
Proposition 4 generalizes the results of Proposition 1 to an environment in which
countries invest in a technology portfolio. When countries are so impatient that distor-
tions to investments are required in order to satisfy compliance with less emissions, there
will be underinvestment in adaptation technology. As before, there will also be over-
investment in clean technologies and underinvestment in brown technologies, provided
that they are substitutes or weak complements. The novel result obtained when coun-
tries invest in multiple technologies can be seen in the case of strong complementarity,
i.e., when b′′i,BC (·) is sufficiently large. In this case, clean and brown technologies will
be distorted in the same direction, namely, there will be overinvestment in the case of
clean dominance, but underinvestment in the case of brown dominance. Intuitively, in
the case that the marginal benefit from polluting depends more on rBi than on r
C
i , then
rBi must decrease in order to satisfy a binding compliance constraint, when the discount
factor falls. Thus, rCi will decrease together with r
B
i in the best equilibrium. However,
once clean technology is sufficiently specialized that (C-Di) holds, then the best way to
satisfy the compliance constraint will be to distort rCi upwards. In this situation, r
B
i
increases together with rCi in the best equilibrium. Hence, an important implication of
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the analysis is that under strong complementarity, a complete shift to an economy based
on clean technology is unwarranted, even under the best climate agreement.18
The comparative statics described in Section 3.1 can be easily extended to the context
of multiple technologies. Of particular relevance is the comparative statics of changes in
investment costs. Countries that are more reluctant because they face a higher cost of
investment in clean technology should invest more in clean technology and less in brown
technology, unless the two technologies are strong complements.
5 Technological Spillovers
Cooperation on environmental policies may be plagued by free-riding problems arising
from two types of externalities. The first is the environmental harm emphasized in the
baseline model, while the second is technological spillovers, especially when the protection
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is relatively weak. Thus, one country’s investment
in technology and R&D benefits other countries through technological trade, diffusion,
and learning by doing. The weaker the protection of IPRs, the more other countries
can benefit without having to pay, and the smaller will be the fraction of the total value
enjoyed by the investing country. It turns out that these spillovers alter the strategic role
of technology, and that this role is different if countries are homogenous than if they are
not.
Let e ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of a country’s investment that benefits the others instead
of the investor. A country’s per-period utility can then be written as:
ui = bi (gi, zi)− hic (zi)
∑
j∈N
gj − kiri, where zi ≡ (1− e) ri + e
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
rj. (2)
The term (1− e) is a normalization and can be removed without affecting the results.19
The term is natural, however, when a reduction in e should be interpreted as stronger
protection of IPRs, since in that case neighboring countries must pay the innovating
country when using the new technology. In this context, the first-best investment level
r∗i remains unchanged as e varies, but the BAU investment level is lower when e is small,
since the innovating country is then capturing more of the total gain. Thus, it is no
longer true that countries invest the efficient amount conditional on emissions. Moreover,
18Acemoglu et al. (2016) develop a growth model in which dirty and clean technologies compete in
each of many product lines. As in the current paper, they also find that a shift toward clean technology
is possible only when the two energy technologies are not complementary.
19If we had ẑi = ri+
ê
n−1
∑
j 6=i rj instead of zi, we could define e from e/ (1− e) ≡ ê and zi ≡ ẑi (1− e)
in order to write bi (gi, zi)− hic (zi)
∑
j∈N gj − kri.
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if the spillovers are sufficiently large, it may be that r∗i > r
bau
i regardless of the type of
technology.
Instead of letting each country decide on the expenditure ri, we find it to be more
realistic (and tractable) to assume that each country decides on its technology-level target,
zi. Solving for the ri’s in (2), we get ri ≡ 1n(1−e)−1 [(n− 1− e) zi − e
∑
j 6=i zj], illustrating
that j’s technology reduces i’s cost of achieving its target, zi, thanks to the technological
spillovers.
Unlike in the baseline model, BAU is no longer the worst SPE, since a country could, in
principle, invest less than rbaui as a punishment after defection.
20 To facilitate comparison
of the results to those in Section 3, we continue to focus on the Pareto-optimal SPEs that
are enforced by trigger strategies in which defection leads to BAU forever.
5.1 Homogenous Countries and Intellectual Property
IPRs protection may encourage firms to innovate more than they otherwise
would.
IPCC (2014:1036)
We start out with a situation in which countries are identical. Furthermore, we restrict
our attention to symmetric SPEs in which every investment level is the same, so that a
country’s equilibrium utility can be written as u (z) ≡ b(g, z)− hc (z)ng − kz. The best
equilibrium supports (g, zi = z)i∈N , where z maximizes u (z) subject to the compliance
constraints. The compliance constraint at the emission stage is similar to the one in the
baseline model, that is,
∆g (z, δ) ≡ u (z)− ubau − 1− δ
δ
(g − g)ψ (z) ≥ 0, (CCge)
where ubau ≡ b (g, zbau)− hc (zbau)ng − kzbau and ψ (z) ≡ ((b (g, z)− b(g, z))/(g − g))−
hc (z). The compliance constraint at the investment stage is:
∆z (z, δ) ≡ u (z)− ubau − (1− δ) e (n− 1)
n (1− e)− 1k
(
z − zbau) ≥ 0. (CCze)
Condition (CCze) is trivially satisfied if e = 0 or if z ≤ zbau. When e > 0 and z > zbau, a
country that deviates at the investment stage will not only enjoy its BAU continuation
value, but will also benefit from the investments made by the other countries. In that case,
20Note that it is only when e > 0 that a reduced ri can be used to punish other countries.
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countries may be tempted to deviate even at the investment stage. Thus, it is no longer
true that it is always harder to motivate less emissions than to motivate investment.
To show this formally, let δg (z) and δz (z) identify the thresholds of discount factors
associated with the binding constraints (CCge) and (CC
z
e). The upper bounds δ
g
and δ
z
are defined as the levels of δ that solve ∆g (z∗, δ) = 0 and ∆z (z∗, δ) = 0 at the first-best
level z∗. Thus, if δ ≥ max
{
δ
g
, δ
z
}
, both compliance constraints hold for z = z∗ and the
best equilibrium is simply the first best. When δ < max
{
δ
g
, δ
z
}
, investment must be
distorted away from its first-best level to ensure compliance with the agreement. Based
on a comparison between (CCge) and (CC
z
e), it is apparent that when e is sufficiently
large, the compliance constraint at the investment stage is harder to satisfy than the
compliance constraint at the emission stage. As we will show in the proof of the following
proposition, there exists a threshold level e˜ > 0 such that δ
z ≤ δg for e ≤ e˜ and δz > δg
otherwise.
If spillovers are small, i.e., e ≤ e˜, because of, for example, the presence of strong
protection of IPRs, constraint (CCge) binds first as δ becomes smaller and investment
distortions will be as described in Proposition 1: there will be overinvestment if technology
is green and underinvestment if it is non-green. Formally, let zg (δ) be defined as the z
that maximizes u (z) subject to ∆g (z, δ) ≥ 0. Analogously to the baseline model, the
function zg (δ) is decreasing in δ when the technology is green, but increasing when the
technology is non-green.
If spillovers are large, i.e., e > e˜, constraint (CCze) binds first. To motivate compli-
ance at the investment stage, the equilibrium investment levels must be lower in order
to weaken the temptation to deviate. There must then be underinvestment, whatever
the type of technology a country possesses. Formally, let zz (δ) be defined as the z max-
imizing u (z) subject to ∆z (z, δ) ≥ 0. When such a constraint binds, the function zz (δ)
increases in δ regardless of the technology type because a smaller δ increases the gain
from free riding on investments when z > zbau. Figure 1 provides an illustration of how
different levels of technological spillovers affect strategic investments in the case of green
technology.
As before, there exists a lower bound δ (e), equal to the largest δ, such that if δ < δ (e),
then there is no z that can satisfy all compliance constraints.21
Proposition 5 There exists a best equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ (e). For each i ∈ N ,
it supports zi = z
∗ when δ ≥ max
{
δ
g
, δ
z
}
. Otherwise,
21If e = e˜, then δ
g
= δ
z
= δ (e), so that the first best is possible if δ ≥ δ (e); otherwise no equilibrium
supports gi = g for each i.
20
z
<latexit sha1_base6 4="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB 6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi 8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kz X/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3Nre J2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTc CO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAz aqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKw wTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIIt Z/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNS O97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgO ukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6 btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV 3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==< /latexit><latexit sha1_base6 4="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB 6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi 8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kz X/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3Nre J2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTc CO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAz aqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKw wTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIIt Z/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNS O97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgO ukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6 btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV 3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==< /latexit><latexit sha1_base6 4="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB 6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi 8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kz X/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3Nre J2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTc CO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAz aqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKw wTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIIt Z/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNS O97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgO ukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6 btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV 3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==< /latexit><latexit sha1_base6 4="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB 6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi 8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kz X/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3Nre J2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTc CO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAz aqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKw wTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIIt Z/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNS O97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgO ukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6 btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV 3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==< /latexit>
z
<latexit sha1_base64="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1 q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H 1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MyS Q1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1 q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H 1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MyS Q1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1 q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H 1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MyS Q1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HDzXchlsPlmuEyZZ/9zFJ+iVC6I=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1 q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Ae0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IN/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3H 1FpHst7M0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUeOqXK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MyS Q1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHpwX5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwB6UGM/g==</latexit>
zg ( )
<latexit sha1_base6 4="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8Czc qFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1 l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fW NMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfEykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8 i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5 ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bW ql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3 own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI/sD4/AFzNJfM</late xit><latexit sha1_base6 4="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8Czc qFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1 l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fW NMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfEykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8 i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5 ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bW ql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3 own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI/sD4/AFzNJfM</late xit><latexit sha1_base6 4="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8Czc qFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1 l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fW NMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfEykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8 i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5 ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bW ql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3 own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI/sD4/AFzNJfM</late xit><latexit sha1_base6 4="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8Czc qFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1 l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fW NMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfEykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8 i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5 ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bW ql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3 own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI/sD4/AFzNJfM</late xit>
zg ( )
<latexit sha1_base64="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8CzcqFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fWNMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfE ykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bWql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI /sD4/AFzNJfM</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8CzcqFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fWNMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfE ykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bWql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI /sD4/AFzNJfM</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8CzcqFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fWNMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfE ykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bWql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI /sD4/AFzNJfM</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5TEoYnNSzKC5agdsM9wyNnT1DFE=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7tL+2JbgY4VS2wOJzFaiP8CzcqFXLJlVcwq6TKw5KZE5Gr3il+1FPAkgRC6Z1l3LjNFJmULBJYwLdqIhZnzI+tDNaMgC0E46fWNMTzPFo36ksgqRTtXfE ykLtB4FbtYZMBzoRW8i/ud1E/QvnFSEcYIQ8tkiP5EUIzrJhHpCAUc5ygjjSmS3Uj5ginHMkpuEYC2+vExataplVq2bWql+OY8jT47ICakQi5yTOrkmDdIknDySZ/JK3own48V4Nz5mrTljPnNI /sD4/AFzNJfM</latexit>
zr ( )
<latexit sha1_base6 4="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsX OgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumd dcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3x jT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3RMoCrUeBm3UGDAd60Zu I/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGO MsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumV qpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN +PJeDHejY9Za86YzxySPzA+fwCE6JfX</late xit><latexit sha1_base6 4="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsX OgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumd dcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3x jT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3RMoCrUeBm3UGDAd60Zu I/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGO MsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumV qpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN +PJeDHejY9Za86YzxySPzA+fwCE6JfX</late xit><latexit sha1_base6 4="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsX OgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumd dcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3x jT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3RMoCrUeBm3UGDAd60Zu I/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGO MsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumV qpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN +PJeDHejY9Za86YzxySPzA+fwCE6JfX</late xit><latexit sha1_base6 4="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAAC BnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0Gv XiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49 Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtf WN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmi iQAmdWAELXAltd3g18dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8K X3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsX OgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumd dcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3x jT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3RMoCrUeBm3UGDAd60Zu I/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGO MsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumV qpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN +PJeDHejY9Za86YzxySPzA+fwCE6JfX</late xit>
zr ( )
<latexit sha1_base64="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsXOgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumddcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3xjT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3R MoCrUeBm3UGDAd60ZuI/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGOMsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumVqpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN+PJeDHejY9Za86YzxyS PzA+fwCE6JfX</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsXOgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumddcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3xjT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3R MoCrUeBm3UGDAd60ZuI/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGOMsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumVqpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN+PJeDHejY9Za86YzxyS PzA+fwCE6JfX</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsXOgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumddcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3xjT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3R MoCrUeBm3UGDAd60ZuI/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGOMsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumVqpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN+PJeDHejY9Za86YzxyS PzA+fwCE6JfX</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="9EuzBMWErXsM7rM/InWGNCkJ9Dw=">AAACBnicbVDJSgNBEO2JW4 xb1KMIjYkQL2EmFz0GvXiMYBbIjKGnpyZp0rPQXSPEIScv/ooXD4p49Ru8+TdOloMmPih4vFdFVT03lkKjaX4buZXVtfWN/GZha3tnd6+4f9DSUaI4NHkkI9VxmQYpQmiiQAmdWAELXAltd3g18 dv3oLSIwlscxeAErB8KX3CGmdQrHpcf7lI1tiX4WKHU9kAis5XoD/CsXOgVS2bVnIIuE2tOSmSORq/4ZXsRTwIIkUumddcyY3RSplBwCeOCnWiIGR+yPnQzGrIAtJNO3xjT00zxqB+prEKkU/X3R MoCrUeBm3UGDAd60ZuI/3ndBP0LJxVhnCCEfLbITyTFiE4yoZ5QwFGOMsK4EtmtlA+YYhyz5CYhWIsvL5NWrWqZVeumVqpfzuPIkyNyQirEIuekTq5JgzQJJ4/kmbySN+PJeDHejY9Za86YzxyS PzA+fwCE6JfX</latexit>
 
z
<latexit sha1_base64="6ue/Y/KvG6/sV1FAj2M4bDWDnjM=">AAACA3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq4 RXgA0WixaJqUq6wFjBwlgk+pCaUDmO01p1nMh2kEoUiYVfYWEAIVZ+go2/wWkzQMuRLB2dc66u7/ETRqWy7W+jsrK6tr5R3TS3tnd296z9g66MU4FJB8csFn0fScIoJx1FFSP9RBAU+Yz0/MlV4 ffuiZA05rdqmhAvQiNOQ4qR0tLQOoJ1N9aBYj5zA8IUyu+yh7xumkOrZjfsGeAycUpSAyXaQ+vLDWKcRoQrzJCUA8dOlJchoShmJDfdVJIE4QkakYGmHEVEetnshhyeaiWAYSz04wrO1N8TGYqkn Ea+TkZIjeWiV4j/eYNUhRdeRnmSKsLxfFGYMqhiWBQCAyoIVmyqCcKC6r9CPEYCYaVrK0pwFk9eJt1mw7Ebzk2z1ros66iCY3ACzoADzkELXIM26AAMHsEzeAVvxpPxYrwbH/NoxShnDsEfGJ8/ BE6XFw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6ue/Y/KvG6/sV1FAj2M4bDWDnjM=">AAACA3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq4 RXgA0WixaJqUq6wFjBwlgk+pCaUDmO01p1nMh2kEoUiYVfYWEAIVZ+go2/wWkzQMuRLB2dc66u7/ETRqWy7W+jsrK6tr5R3TS3tnd296z9g66MU4FJB8csFn0fScIoJx1FFSP9RBAU+Yz0/MlV4 ffuiZA05rdqmhAvQiNOQ4qR0tLQOoJ1N9aBYj5zA8IUyu+yh7xumkOrZjfsGeAycUpSAyXaQ+vLDWKcRoQrzJCUA8dOlJchoShmJDfdVJIE4QkakYGmHEVEetnshhyeaiWAYSz04wrO1N8TGYqkn Ea+TkZIjeWiV4j/eYNUhRdeRnmSKsLxfFGYMqhiWBQCAyoIVmyqCcKC6r9CPEYCYaVrK0pwFk9eJt1mw7Ebzk2z1ros66iCY3ACzoADzkELXIM26AAMHsEzeAVvxpPxYrwbH/NoxShnDsEfGJ8/ BE6XFw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6ue/Y/KvG6/sV1FAj2M4bDWDnjM=">AAACA3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq4 RXgA0WixaJqUq6wFjBwlgk+pCaUDmO01p1nMh2kEoUiYVfYWEAIVZ+go2/wWkzQMuRLB2dc66u7/ETRqWy7W+jsrK6tr5R3TS3tnd296z9g66MU4FJB8csFn0fScIoJx1FFSP9RBAU+Yz0/MlV4 ffuiZA05rdqmhAvQiNOQ4qR0tLQOoJ1N9aBYj5zA8IUyu+yh7xumkOrZjfsGeAycUpSAyXaQ+vLDWKcRoQrzJCUA8dOlJchoShmJDfdVJIE4QkakYGmHEVEetnshhyeaiWAYSz04wrO1N8TGYqkn Ea+TkZIjeWiV4j/eYNUhRdeRnmSKsLxfFGYMqhiWBQCAyoIVmyqCcKC6r9CPEYCYaVrK0pwFk9eJt1mw7Ebzk2z1ros66iCY3ACzoADzkELXIM26AAMHsEzeAVvxpPxYrwbH/NoxShnDsEfGJ8/ BE6XFw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6ue/Y/KvG6/sV1FAj2M4bDWDnjM=">AAACA3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq4 RXgA0WixaJqUq6wFjBwlgk+pCaUDmO01p1nMh2kEoUiYVfYWEAIVZ+go2/wWkzQMuRLB2dc66u7/ETRqWy7W+jsrK6tr5R3TS3tnd296z9g66MU4FJB8csFn0fScIoJx1FFSP9RBAU+Yz0/MlV4 ffuiZA05rdqmhAvQiNOQ4qR0tLQOoJ1N9aBYj5zA8IUyu+yh7xumkOrZjfsGeAycUpSAyXaQ+vLDWKcRoQrzJCUA8dOlJchoShmJDfdVJIE4QkakYGmHEVEetnshhyeaiWAYSz04wrO1N8TGYqkn Ea+TkZIjeWiV4j/eYNUhRdeRnmSKsLxfFGYMqhiWBQCAyoIVmyqCcKC6r9CPEYCYaVrK0pwFk9eJt1mw7Ebzk2z1ros66iCY3ACzoADzkELXIM26AAMHsEzeAVvxpPxYrwbH/NoxShnDsEfGJ8/ BE6XFw==</latexit>
 
g
<latexit sha1_base64="NvhjTjQDow5lj6g 1QVJfBCeaGMs=">AAACA3icbVC9TsMwGHTKXwl/ATZYLFokpirpAmMFC2ORaIvUhMpxnNaqY0e 2g1RFlVh4FRYGEGLlJdh4G5w2A7ScZOl0d58+fxemjCrtut9WZWV1bX2jumlvbe/s7jn7B10lM olJBwsm5F2IFGGUk46mmpG7VBKUhIz0wvFV4fceiFRU8Fs9SUmQoCGnMcVIG2ngHMG6L0ygmM /9iDCNpvf5cFq37YFTcxvuDHCZeCWpgRLtgfPlRwJnCeEaM6RU33NTHeRIaooZmdp+pkiK8BgN Sd9QjhKignx2wxSeGiWCsZDmcQ1n6u+JHCVKTZLQJBOkR2rRK8T/vH6m44sgpzzNNOF4vijOG NQCFoXAiEqCNZsYgrCk5q8Qj5BEWJvaihK8xZOXSbfZ8NyGd9OstS7LOqrgGJyAM+CBc9AC16A NOgCDR/AMXsGb9WS9WO/WxzxascqZQ/AH1ucP5yeXBA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NvhjTjQDow5lj6g 1QVJfBCeaGMs=">AAACA3icbVC9TsMwGHTKXwl/ATZYLFokpirpAmMFC2ORaIvUhMpxnNaqY0e 2g1RFlVh4FRYGEGLlJdh4G5w2A7ScZOl0d58+fxemjCrtut9WZWV1bX2jumlvbe/s7jn7B10lM olJBwsm5F2IFGGUk46mmpG7VBKUhIz0wvFV4fceiFRU8Fs9SUmQoCGnMcVIG2ngHMG6L0ygmM /9iDCNpvf5cFq37YFTcxvuDHCZeCWpgRLtgfPlRwJnCeEaM6RU33NTHeRIaooZmdp+pkiK8BgN Sd9QjhKignx2wxSeGiWCsZDmcQ1n6u+JHCVKTZLQJBOkR2rRK8T/vH6m44sgpzzNNOF4vijOG NQCFoXAiEqCNZsYgrCk5q8Qj5BEWJvaihK8xZOXSbfZ8NyGd9OstS7LOqrgGJyAM+CBc9AC16A NOgCDR/AMXsGb9WS9WO/WxzxascqZQ/AH1ucP5yeXBA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NvhjTjQDow5lj6g 1QVJfBCeaGMs=">AAACA3icbVC9TsMwGHTKXwl/ATZYLFokpirpAmMFC2ORaIvUhMpxnNaqY0e 2g1RFlVh4FRYGEGLlJdh4G5w2A7ScZOl0d58+fxemjCrtut9WZWV1bX2jumlvbe/s7jn7B10lM olJBwsm5F2IFGGUk46mmpG7VBKUhIz0wvFV4fceiFRU8Fs9SUmQoCGnMcVIG2ngHMG6L0ygmM /9iDCNpvf5cFq37YFTcxvuDHCZeCWpgRLtgfPlRwJnCeEaM6RU33NTHeRIaooZmdp+pkiK8BgN Sd9QjhKignx2wxSeGiWCsZDmcQ1n6u+JHCVKTZLQJBOkR2rRK8T/vH6m44sgpzzNNOF4vijOG NQCFoXAiEqCNZsYgrCk5q8Qj5BEWJvaihK8xZOXSbfZ8NyGd9OstS7LOqrgGJyAM+CBc9AC16A NOgCDR/AMXsGb9WS9WO/WxzxascqZQ/AH1ucP5yeXBA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NvhjTjQDow5lj6g 1QVJfBCeaGMs=">AAACA3icbVC9TsMwGHTKXwl/ATZYLFokpirpAmMFC2ORaIvUhMpxnNaqY0e 2g1RFlVh4FRYGEGLlJdh4G5w2A7ScZOl0d58+fxemjCrtut9WZWV1bX2jumlvbe/s7jn7B10lM olJBwsm5F2IFGGUk46mmpG7VBKUhIz0wvFV4fceiFRU8Fs9SUmQoCGnMcVIG2ngHMG6L0ygmM /9iDCNpvf5cFq37YFTcxvuDHCZeCWpgRLtgfPlRwJnCeEaM6RU33NTHeRIaooZmdp+pkiK8BgN Sd9QjhKignx2wxSeGiWCsZDmcQ1n6u+JHCVKTZLQJBOkR2rRK8T/vH6m44sgpzzNNOF4vijOG NQCFoXAiEqCNZsYgrCk5q8Qj5BEWJvaihK8xZOXSbfZ8NyGd9OstS7LOqrgGJyAM+CBc9AC16A NOgCDR/AMXsGb9WS9WO/WxzxascqZQ/AH1ucP5yeXBA==</latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ3GmoandeQKqlsqGhxDtEHdUh4=">AAAB8nicbVBNS8NAEN3Urx q/qh69LLaCp5L0oseiF48VbCu0oWw2m3bpZjfsToQS+jO8eFDEq7/Gm//GTZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8MBXcgOd9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7pGZVpyrpUCaUfQ2KY4JJ1gYNgj6lmJAkF64fT28LvP zFtuJIPMEtZkJCx5DGnBKw0wI1hxASQhuuOanWv6S2A14lfkjoq0RnVvoaRolnCJFBBjBn4XgpBTjRwKtjcHWaGpYROyZgNLJUkYSbIFyfP8YVVIhwrbUsCXqi/J3KSGDNLQtuZEJiYVa8Q//MGG cTXQc5lmgGTdLkozgQGhYv/ccQ1oyBmlhCqub0V0wnRhIJNqQjBX315nfRaTd9r+vetevumjKOKztA5ukQ+ukJtdIc6qIsoUugZvaI3B5wX5935WLZWnHLmFP2B8/kDD7yPyA==</latexit>
z⇤
<latexit sha1_base64="d1R77dxkDujKmZ1FT/Bnw2KM2HA=">AAAB9XicbVDLTgJBEOz1if hCPXqZCCaeyC4XPRK9eMREHgksZHaYhQmzj8z0anDDf3jxoDFe/Rdv/o2zsAcFK+mkUtWd7i4vlkKjbX9ba+sbm1vbhZ3i7t7+wWHp6Lilo0Qx3mSRjFTHo5pLEfImCpS8EytOA0/ytje5yfz2A 1daROE9TmPuBnQUCl8wikbqV576aY9qnFWKBoNS2a7ac5BV4uSkDDkag9JXbxixJOAhMkm17jp2jG5KFQom+azYSzSPKZvQEe8aGtKAazedXz0j50YZEj9SpkIkc/X3REoDraeBZzoDimO97GXif 143Qf/KTUUYJ8hDtljkJ5JgRLIIyFAozlBODaFMCXMrYWOqKEMTVBaCs/zyKmnVqo5dde5q5fp1HkcBTuEMLsCBS6jDLTSgCQwUPMMrvFmP1ov1bn0sWtesfOYE/sD6/AEVs5Do</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="d1R77dxkDujKmZ1FT/Bnw2KM2HA=">AAAB9XicbVDLTgJBEOz1if hCPXqZCCaeyC4XPRK9eMREHgksZHaYhQmzj8z0anDDf3jxoDFe/Rdv/o2zsAcFK+mkUtWd7i4vlkKjbX9ba+sbm1vbhZ3i7t7+wWHp6Lilo0Qx3mSRjFTHo5pLEfImCpS8EytOA0/ytje5yfz2A 1daROE9TmPuBnQUCl8wikbqV576aY9qnFWKBoNS2a7ac5BV4uSkDDkag9JXbxixJOAhMkm17jp2jG5KFQom+azYSzSPKZvQEe8aGtKAazedXz0j50YZEj9SpkIkc/X3REoDraeBZzoDimO97GXif 143Qf/KTUUYJ8hDtljkJ5JgRLIIyFAozlBODaFMCXMrYWOqKEMTVBaCs/zyKmnVqo5dde5q5fp1HkcBTuEMLsCBS6jDLTSgCQwUPMMrvFmP1ov1bn0sWtesfOYE/sD6/AEVs5Do</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="d1R77dxkDujKmZ1FT/Bnw2KM2HA=">AAAB9XicbVDLTgJBEOz1if hCPXqZCCaeyC4XPRK9eMREHgksZHaYhQmzj8z0anDDf3jxoDFe/Rdv/o2zsAcFK+mkUtWd7i4vlkKjbX9ba+sbm1vbhZ3i7t7+wWHp6Lilo0Qx3mSRjFTHo5pLEfImCpS8EytOA0/ytje5yfz2A 1daROE9TmPuBnQUCl8wikbqV576aY9qnFWKBoNS2a7ac5BV4uSkDDkag9JXbxixJOAhMkm17jp2jG5KFQom+azYSzSPKZvQEe8aGtKAazedXz0j50YZEj9SpkIkc/X3REoDraeBZzoDimO97GXif 143Qf/KTUUYJ8hDtljkJ5JgRLIIyFAozlBODaFMCXMrYWOqKEMTVBaCs/zyKmnVqo5dde5q5fp1HkcBTuEMLsCBS6jDLTSgCQwUPMMrvFmP1ov1bn0sWtesfOYE/sD6/AEVs5Do</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="d1R77dxkDujKmZ1FT/Bnw2KM2HA=">AAAB9XicbVDLTgJBEOz1if hCPXqZCCaeyC4XPRK9eMREHgksZHaYhQmzj8z0anDDf3jxoDFe/Rdv/o2zsAcFK+mkUtWd7i4vlkKjbX9ba+sbm1vbhZ3i7t7+wWHp6Lilo0Qx3mSRjFTHo5pLEfImCpS8EytOA0/ytje5yfz2A 1daROE9TmPuBnQUCl8wikbqV576aY9qnFWKBoNS2a7ac5BV4uSkDDkag9JXbxixJOAhMkm17jp2jG5KFQom+azYSzSPKZvQEe8aGtKAazedXz0j50YZEj9SpkIkc/X3REoDraeBZzoDimO97GXif 143Qf/KTUUYJ8hDtljkJ5JgRLIIyFAozlBODaFMCXMrYWOqKEMTVBaCs/zyKmnVqo5dde5q5fp1HkcBTuEMLsCBS6jDLTSgCQwUPMMrvFmP1ov1bn0sWtesfOYE/sD6/AEVs5Do</latexit>
  (e)
<latexit sha1_base6 4="Z5xsSf0jJ4UgQ8ubxRhbilyvLwk=">AAAC DnicbVC7TsMwFHXKu7wKjCwWpVJZqqQLjAgWx iJRQGqiynFuWquOE9k3SFXUL2DhV1gYQIiVm Y2/wWk78DqSpaNz7tH1PWEmhUHX/XQqC4tLyy ura9X1jc2t7drO7rVJc82hy1OZ6tuQGZBCQRc FSrjNNLAklHATjs5L/+YOtBGpusJxBkHCBkrE gjO0Ur/WOPRzFYEu84UfgUQ28SXE2KQUfC0GQ zyqHvZrdbflTkH/Em9O6mSOTr/24UcpzxNQy CUzpue5GQYF0yi4hEnVzw1kjI/YAHqWKpaACY rpORPasEpE41Tbp5BO1e+JgiXGjJPQTiYMh+a 3V4r/eb0c45OgECrLERSfLYpzSTGlZTc0Eho4 yrEljGth/0r5kGnG0TZYtSV4v0/+S67bLc9te Zft+unZvI5Vsk8OSJN45JickgvSIV3CyT15J M/kxXlwnpxX5202WnHmmT3yA877FwKlm2Q=</ latexit><latexit sha1_base6 4="Z5xsSf0jJ4UgQ8ubxRhbilyvLwk=">AAAC DnicbVC7TsMwFHXKu7wKjCwWpVJZqqQLjAgWx iJRQGqiynFuWquOE9k3SFXUL2DhV1gYQIiVm Y2/wWk78DqSpaNz7tH1PWEmhUHX/XQqC4tLyy ura9X1jc2t7drO7rVJc82hy1OZ6tuQGZBCQRc FSrjNNLAklHATjs5L/+YOtBGpusJxBkHCBkrE gjO0Ur/WOPRzFYEu84UfgUQ28SXE2KQUfC0GQ zyqHvZrdbflTkH/Em9O6mSOTr/24UcpzxNQy CUzpue5GQYF0yi4hEnVzw1kjI/YAHqWKpaACY rpORPasEpE41Tbp5BO1e+JgiXGjJPQTiYMh+a 3V4r/eb0c45OgECrLERSfLYpzSTGlZTc0Eho4 yrEljGth/0r5kGnG0TZYtSV4v0/+S67bLc9te Zft+unZvI5Vsk8OSJN45JickgvSIV3CyT15J M/kxXlwnpxX5202WnHmmT3yA877FwKlm2Q=</ latexit><latexit sha1_base6 4="Z5xsSf0jJ4UgQ8ubxRhbilyvLwk=">AAAC DnicbVC7TsMwFHXKu7wKjCwWpVJZqqQLjAgWx iJRQGqiynFuWquOE9k3SFXUL2DhV1gYQIiVm Y2/wWk78DqSpaNz7tH1PWEmhUHX/XQqC4tLyy ura9X1jc2t7drO7rVJc82hy1OZ6tuQGZBCQRc FSrjNNLAklHATjs5L/+YOtBGpusJxBkHCBkrE gjO0Ur/WOPRzFYEu84UfgUQ28SXE2KQUfC0GQ zyqHvZrdbflTkH/Em9O6mSOTr/24UcpzxNQy CUzpue5GQYF0yi4hEnVzw1kjI/YAHqWKpaACY rpORPasEpE41Tbp5BO1e+JgiXGjJPQTiYMh+a 3V4r/eb0c45OgECrLERSfLYpzSTGlZTc0Eho4 yrEljGth/0r5kGnG0TZYtSV4v0/+S67bLc9te Zft+unZvI5Vsk8OSJN45JickgvSIV3CyT15J M/kxXlwnpxX5202WnHmmT3yA877FwKlm2Q=</ latexit><latexit sha1_base6 4="Z5xsSf0jJ4UgQ8ubxRhbilyvLwk=">AAAC DnicbVC7TsMwFHXKu7wKjCwWpVJZqqQLjAgWx iJRQGqiynFuWquOE9k3SFXUL2DhV1gYQIiVm Y2/wWk78DqSpaNz7tH1PWEmhUHX/XQqC4tLyy ura9X1jc2t7drO7rVJc82hy1OZ6tuQGZBCQRc FSrjNNLAklHATjs5L/+YOtBGpusJxBkHCBkrE gjO0Ur/WOPRzFYEu84UfgUQ28SXE2KQUfC0GQ zyqHvZrdbflTkH/Em9O6mSOTr/24UcpzxNQy CUzpue5GQYF0yi4hEnVzw1kjI/YAHqWKpaACY rpORPasEpE41Tbp5BO1e+JgiXGjJPQTiYMh+a 3V4r/eb0c45OgECrLERSfLYpzSTGlZTc0Eho4 yrEljGth/0r5kGnG0TZYtSV4v0/+S67bLc9te Zft+unZvI5Vsk8OSJN45JickgvSIV3CyT15J M/kxXlwnpxX5202WnHmmT3yA877FwKlm2Q=</ latexit>
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Figure 1: With small spillovers (left panel), the emission stage compliance constraint
(dashed line) will bind first and overinvestment may be necessary. With large spillovers
(right panel), the investment stage compliance constraint (dotted line) becomes more dif-
ficult to satisfy and underinvestment may be necessary.
(i) if e < e˜, then δ
g
> δ
z
and zi = z
g (δ) > z∗ when the technology is green and
zi = z
g (δ) < z∗ when technology is non-green;
(ii) if e > e˜, then δ
g
< δ
z
and zi = z
z (δ) < z∗ regardless of the type of technology.
Compared to Proposition 1, the qualitative difference is that green investments decline
with δ if e > e˜. When countries are homogenous, large spillovers discourage investments,
since they impose a constraint on the investment levels that can be sustained as SPEs.
Specifically, requiring a high level of investment in green technology to motivate compli-
ance at the emission stage may not be possible if the spillovers are large. Thus, under a
policy that reduces the spillover by, for example, strengthening the protection of IPRs,
compliance can be motivated by requiring more investment in green technology without
concern that the compliance constraint at the investment stage will be violated.
5.2 Heterogeneous Countries and Technology Transfers
Protection of IPRs also works to slow the diffusion of new technologies, because
it raises their cost and potentially limits their availability.
IPCC (2014:1036)
The Paris Agreement encourages technology transfers to developing countries. Article
10 states that the countries “shall strengthen cooperative action on technology develop-
ment and transfer.” In addition, “international trade and foreign direct investment are the
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primary means by which new knowledge and technology are transferred between countries”
(IPCC, 2014:1035).
Thus, in terms of the model, technological transfers may require a larger e. This
type of technology transfer can be rationalized in our framework. To see this, note
that when the critical assumption made about homogenous countries in the previous
subsection is relaxed, spillovers may be beneficial to the agreement since the possibility
of technology transfers emerges. Intuitively, if the countries with the weakest compliance
constraints, i.e., the least reluctant countries, are willing to invest more, then, in the
presence of technological spillovers, these investments relax the compliance constraints
for other countries.
To show this formally, let δi (e) measure the smallest discount factor at which country
i’s compliance constraints at the emission and investment stages hold if every country
invests at the same level, say, ẑi (e). Without spillovers, we know that a best equilibrium
exists if and only if δ ≥ δ (0) ≡ maxj δj (0). Let i = arg maxj δj (0) denote the most reluc-
tant country in the absence of spillovers. We will say that country j is less reluctant than
country i if, whenever i’s compliance constraints hold, j’s compliance constraints are non-
binding. This implies that, at δ = δi (e), country j can set any zj ∈ [ẑi (e) , ẑi (e) + θj,i]
for some θj,i > 0, without violating its own compliance constraints, even if the other
countries specify only ẑi (e). Since heterogeneity can originate from a variety of sources,
θj,i is a measure of the degree of heterogeneity between i and j, for any given e. The
highest level of heterogeneity is defined as θ ≡ maxj θj,i.
Let δ (e) be the smallest discount factor at which we can sustain a best equilibrium,
i.e., an SPE which involves less emissions by all countries, for some investment levels.
With these definitions, we are able to show that spillovers can improve the possibility of
sustaining a best equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For every e > 0, we have:
(i) δ (e) < δ (0) if the heterogeneity, θ, is sufficiently large;
(ii) When δ ∈ (δ (e) , δ (0)), some countries will invest more in order to motivate the
most reluctant countries to comply.
In other words, if countries are sufficiently heterogeneous, then the set of discount
factors that support a best equilibrium can be expanded if the spillover is positive rather
than zero. This is because spillovers allow countries taking advantage of the heterogeneity,
so that the compliance constraints of the most reluctant country can be weakened by the
investments of the less reluctant countries. In this way, technological transfers facilitate
compliance.
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6 Technology and Imperfect Transparency
Measurement, reporting, and verification may be beneficially complemented
by enforcement strategies.
IPCC (2014:1015)
The baseline model assumes that domestic emissions can be perfectly observed. In
reality, emissions at a country level are difficult to monitor, while global emissions as well
as installation of technologies are easier to track (Sterner, 2003). This imperfection leads
to new roles for strategic investment in technologies.
In this section, we assume that domestic emissions cannot be observed and that even
aggregate emissions are imperfectly monitored.22 This imperfection leads to two types of
errors: First, with probability q > 0 there is a type I error when it appears as if there has
been a defection, even if there has not been. Second, with probability 1− p ∈ [0, 1] there
is a type II error when a country has emitted more but the defection goes undetected. In
previous sections, it was assumed that p = 1 and q = 0; in the next subsection, the best
equilibrium as a function of the errors p and q is derived; while in the following subsection
both errors are endogenous.
In this context, we derive a unique Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibrium (PPE)
outcome in which every country emits gi = g in the cooperation phase.
23 A PPE that
supports this outcome is referred to as a best equilibrium. Since investments are assumed
to be perfectly observable, deviations at the investment stage can be detected and dis-
couraged if they are punished by reverting to BAU forever.24 Just as in the baseline
model, the compliance constraint at the investment stage requires only that a country’s
utility be higher than the BAU level. To simplify and isolate the effects of imperfect
monitoring, we henceforth assume that all countries are identical.
22Note that assuming unobserved domestic emissions would not affect the above results if we continued
to assume that aggregate emissions were perfectly monitored, since countries revert to BAU as soon as
some country has defected (even if there is no public information regarding its identity).
23In any PPE: (i) each country’s strategy depends only on public history, which is a sequence of global
emission levels and investment levels, and (ii) no country wants to deviate following any public history.
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a definition of this equilibrium concept.
24It is straightforward to also allow for unobservable investments. Suppose a country can invest r in
an observable technology type, and r̂ in a different unobservable technology type at cost k̂r̂. If both
technology types enter the benefit function b̂ (g, r, r̂), then our analysis will remain valid if we simply
define b (g, r) ≡ max
r̂
b̂ (g, r, r̂)− k̂r̂ for g ∈ {g, g}, since the unobservable investment will always be set
equal to the individually optimal level, conditional on the agreed-upon emission level.
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6.1 Errors and Punishments
We start out by taking the probabilities p and q as given. In order to provide a simple
microfoundation for this situation, suppose that, at the end of each period, the countries
observe a binary signal % ∈ {0, 1}, which conveys information on the imperfectly observed
aggregate emissions. If everyone emits less, % = 1 with probability q. If a single country
emits more, % = 1 with probability p. Let p > q, so that % = 1 is more likely if a country
defects. In equilibrium, the signal % = 1 will be followed by a punishment phase.
Let ω (r) be a country’s continuation value after % = 1, while ω (r) is the continuation
value after % = 0, conditioned on countries having invested a level r in the current
period. Following Abreu et al. (1990), the payoff associated with the best equilibrium is
the largest utility that satisfies the following constraints:
u (r)
1− δ = b(g, r)− hc(r)ng − kr +
δ
1− δ [(1− q)ω (r) + qω (r)] , subject to (3)
u (r)
1− δ ≥ b(g, r)− hc(r)((n− 1) g + g)− kr +
δ
1− δ [(1− p)ω (r) + pω (r)] , (4)
u (r) ≥ ω (r) , ω (r) ≥ ubau. (5)
Eq. (3) defines the intertemporal utility, which is decomposed into current and continua-
tion utilities according to the realization of the signal %. Inequality (4) is the compliance
constraint at the emission stage, while (5) ensures that continuation utilities are feasible.
In order to determine the best equilibrium, it is clear that ω(r) must be as large as
compliance constraint (4) permits and ω(r) = u (r), which implies that:
ω(r) = u (r)− 1− δ
δ (p− q)(g − g)ψ (r) ,
where ψ (r) is as in Section 2. Replacing the optimal values of ω(r) and ω(r) into (3), we
get:
u (r) = b(g, r)− hc(r)ng − kr − q
p− q (g − g)ψ (r) . (6)
Embedded in equation (6) is the efficiency loss (q/ (p− q)) (g − g)ψ (r) associated with
the punishment that is triggered with some probability, even on the equilibrium path.
For q approaching zero, the efficiency loss term vanishes and u (r) tends to the first-best
value.
Let r˜ be the arg max of u(r) in (6). If ω(r˜) ≥ ubau, the punishment ω(r˜) is feasible and
the best equilibrium sustains r˜. Due to the efficiency loss term in (6), the equilibrium
level r˜ is larger than the first-best investment level if technology is green and smaller
if it is not. A feasible punishment ω(r˜) can be supported if countries play BAU after
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the signal % = 1 for T ≤ ∞ periods before returning to the cooperative phase.25 This
strategy implies that:
ω (r) =
(
1− δT )ubau + δTu (r) ≥ ubau. (7)
Condition (7) satisfied with equality implicitly defines the optimal length of punishment
T (δ). It is then apparent that an additional strategic role of investment is to increase
ω (r), or in other words to decrease T , without violating the compliance constraint.
If ω(r˜) < ubau, there is no equilibrium in which countries invest r˜, even if T =∞. In
this case, the best equilibrium requires ω (r) = ubau, i.e., T =∞, and technology invest-
ment r to be distorted even more from its first-best level in order to satisfy the compliance
constraint. Such a technology investment is implicitly determined from ω (r (δ)) = ubau.
Let us denote by δ the level of δ that satisfies ω (r˜) = ubau and by δ the maximal δ, such
that if δ < δ, no PPE supports gi = g in the cooperation phase.
Proposition 7 Given the errors (q, 1− p), there exists a best equilibrium if and only if
δ ≥ δ. If % = 1, it supports gi,t = g and ri,t = rbau for T periods. Otherwise, gi,t = g and
(i) when δ ≥ δ, T ′δ (δ) < 0 and ri,t = r˜ > r∗ if technology is green and ri,t = r˜ < r∗ if
technology is non-green;
(ii) when δ ∈ [δ, δ), T = ∞ and ri,t = r (δ) > r˜ > r∗ if technology is green and ri,t =
r (δ) < r˜ < r∗ if technology is non-green. Furthermore, |r (δ)− r˜| is decreasing in
δ.
The qualitative difference between Proposition 7 and the baseline model without un-
certainty is described in part (i). Since there is always a chance that the penalty will be
triggered by mistake, the first best is impossible to sustain. The compliance constraint
requires a penalty, but its duration should be reduced as much as the compliance con-
straint permits. By requiring countries to invest strategically, the temptation to raise
emissions more than permitted declines and the penalty duration can be reduced without
violating the compliance constraint. Figure 2 plots optimal investments and duration of
punishment as functions of δ in the case of green technology.
6.2 The Optimal Punishment Probability
In order to endogenize the errors and simultaneously capture real-world uncertainty,
denote global emissions by g ≡ g0 +
∑
i∈N gi, where g0 is a random variable, drawn from
25The equilibrium strategy is along the lines of Green and Porter (1984), who show that under imper-
fect monitoring, firms can create collusive incentives by allowing price wars to break out with positive
probability.
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Figure 2: Even for large discount factors, countries overinvest if technology is green. The
large investments permit a shorter punishment phase without violating the compliance
constraint.
a standard normal cdf Φ (·), i.i.d. over time. The shock g0 captures natural variations in
the release of greenhouse gases.
As will be shown in the next result, the best equilibrium specifies a threshold ĝ (r)
above which the punishment phase is initiated. Since punishment is triggered by mistake
as soon as g0 > ĝ (r)−ng, it is beneficial to raise the threshold ĝ (r). However, when doing
so, T must increase for the compliance constraint to hold. By letting the punishment be
as hard as possible, i.e., T = ∞, the threshold ĝ (r) can increase and the likelihood for
errors can be minimized.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique threshold ĝ (r) such that, in the best equilibrium, con-
tinuation utilities are given by:
ω (g, r) =
{
ω (r) = u (r) if g < ĝ (r) ,
ω (r) = ubau if g ≥ ĝ (r) .
Given this threshold, the probability of type I error is q = 1 − Φ(ĝ (r) − ng), while
the probability of type II error is 1− p = Φ(ĝ (r)− (n− 1) g − g). To further reduce the
probability of error on the equilibrium path, q, the threshold ĝ (r) can be increased if the
temptation to defect is reduced, and it is indeed reduced if the level of green technology
increases or that of non-green technology decreases. This possibility is reflected in the
best equilibrium.
Proposition 8 There exists a best equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ. For each i ∈ N , it
supports gi,t = g and ri,t = r
bau if gi,τ > ĝ (r) for some τ < t. Otherwise, gi,t = g and
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(i) ri,t = r̂ > r˜ > r
∗ if technology is green and therefore ĝ′r (r) > 0;
(ii) ri,t = r̂ < r˜ < r
∗ if technology is non-green and therefore ĝ′r (r) < 0;
where r̂ solves the following first-order condition:
b′r
(
g, r
)− hc′r(r)ng − k = (g − g)(L (ĝ (r))ψ′r (r) + ψ (r)L′ĝ (ĝ (r)) dĝ (r)dr
)
,
with L (ĝ (r)) ≡ q/(p− q) ∈ (0,∞).
This result points to a new role for technology. In the baseline model, strategic
technology investments were necessary in order to motivate compliance when the discount
factor is small. In the previous subsection, where p and q were given, strategic investments
reduced the length of the punishment period that was necessary in order to discourage
defections. When ĝ (r) and the errors are endogenous, the new role of technology is to
reduce the probability that the punishment is triggered by mistake, i.e., type I error.
7 Optimal Environmental Policy
There is a distinct role for technology policy in climate change mitigation.
This role is complementary to the role of policies aimed directly at reducing
current GHG emissions.
IPCC (2014:1178)
In this section, we make emissions a continuous variable and enable national govern-
ments to regulate domestic emissions and investments by setting taxes and subsidies.26
Within each country i, a government faces a large number of private decision makers who
decide on investments and emissions, while taking policies as given. We permit invest-
ments in both brown and clean technologies, although for simplicity we ignore adaptation
technology by setting c(ri) = 1 for every ri.
Allowing gi to be continuous of course complicates the analysis. In order to proceed,
we assume identical countries and quadratic functional forms for the benefit function as
26It is convenient to make these two extensions simultaneously, since we cannot determine a unique
emission tax if gi is a binary variable. In fact, any sufficiently large emission tax would implement low
emissions.
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well as for the cost of investment:
ui ≡ b
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)− h∑
j∈N
gi −
∑
σ∈{B,C}
kσ
2
(rσi )
2 , where (8)
b
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
) ≡ −D
2
(
y − (gi + rCi ))2 − Q2 (gi − rBi )2 , (9)
with D and Q being positive constants.27 The net benefit represented by (9) consists of
two terms: The first term captures the disutility if total consumption of energy from fossil
fuels (gi) and renewables (r
C
i ) differs from the bliss point y. The variable r
C
i is a clean tech-
nology, since it reduces the benefit of emissions: ∂2b
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
/∂gi∂r
C
i < 0. The second
term represents the cost of providing (or extracting) fossil fuels, gi, which is quadratic in
the amount of fossil fuel that is provided above the “capacity” level, rBi . The capacity to
provide fossil fuel, rBi , is a brown technology since it reduces the cost of providing gi, and
thus increases the net benefit from consuming fossil fuel: ∂2b
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
/∂gi∂r
B
i > 0.
Under laissez faire, gi increases until the net marginal benefit (including the pro-
duction cost) is equal to zero, i.e., b′g
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
= 0, while equilibrium investment levels
require that the marginal benefit be equal to the marginal cost, i.e., b′σ
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
= kσrσi ,
for every σ ∈ {B,C}. With an emission tax τi and investment subsidy (ςσi )σ∈{B,C}, the
equilibrium conditions are:
b′g
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
= τi and b
′
σ
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
= kσrσi − ςσi for every σ ∈ {B,C} .
We assume that governments cannot commit to future policies. Thus, investment
subsidies are set by governments just before private investors make actual technology
investments, while emission taxes are set just before the consumption of fossil fuel. Fiscal
policies are simultaneously implemented by all governments and are observable by all
countries. The timing of the policy game is shown in Figure 3. Neither subsidies nor
taxes represent actual costs or revenues from the government’s perspective (since they
are simply transfers within the country).
As benchmarks, consider the first best and BAU. The first-best emission decision
is b′g
(
gi, r
B
i , r
C
i
)
= nh, which is implemented by the Pigou tax τ ∗ = nh. There is no
need to also regulate investments and therefore ςσ∗ = 0 for every σ, since firms invest
in technologies at the efficient level, conditional on emissions. Under BAU, national
governments internalize only the local environmental damage from domestic emissions.
Hence, they set τ bau = h and no investment subsidies, i.e., ςσ,bau = 0 for every σ.
27This utility function is a generalization to the multiple technology case of the function considered in
Battaglini and Harstad (2016), who do not study SPEs, but rather the Markov-perfect equilibria when
countries can commit to emission levels.
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(& i ) 
<latexit sha1_base64="jc/VDh6DsCj bTrJWZzG1hmWfunQ=">AAACG3icbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g61QNyXpRpdFNy4r2Ac 0NUymk3bo5MHMTaGE/Icbf8WNC0VcCS78G6dpBW09MHA451zu3OPFgiuwrC+jsLa+ sblV3C7t7O7tH5iHR20VJZKyFo1EJLseUUzwkLWAg2DdWDISeIJ1vPH1zO9MmFQ8Cu 9gGrN+QIYh9zkloCXXrFccwXyoYuxMiI4NA+KmPLtPnZxnjuTDEZxj90eolFyzbNW sHHiV2AtSRgs0XfPDGUQ0CVgIVBClerYVQz8lEjgVLCs5iWIxoWMyZD1NQxIw1U/z2 zJ8ppUB9iOpXwg4V39PpCRQahp4OhkQGKllbyb+5/US8C/7KQ/jBFhI54v8RGCI8K woPOCSURBTTQiVXP8V0xGRhIKuc1aCvXzyKmnXa7ZVs2/r5cbVoo4iOkGnqIpsdIE a6AY1UQtR9ICe0At6NR6NZ+PNeJ9HC8Zi5hj9gfH5DZaaoR4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jc/VDh6DsCj bTrJWZzG1hmWfunQ=">AAACG3icbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g61QNyXpRpdFNy4r2Ac 0NUymk3bo5MHMTaGE/Icbf8WNC0VcCS78G6dpBW09MHA451zu3OPFgiuwrC+jsLa+ sblV3C7t7O7tH5iHR20VJZKyFo1EJLseUUzwkLWAg2DdWDISeIJ1vPH1zO9MmFQ8Cu 9gGrN+QIYh9zkloCXXrFccwXyoYuxMiI4NA+KmPLtPnZxnjuTDEZxj90eolFyzbNW sHHiV2AtSRgs0XfPDGUQ0CVgIVBClerYVQz8lEjgVLCs5iWIxoWMyZD1NQxIw1U/z2 zJ8ppUB9iOpXwg4V39PpCRQahp4OhkQGKllbyb+5/US8C/7KQ/jBFhI54v8RGCI8K woPOCSURBTTQiVXP8V0xGRhIKuc1aCvXzyKmnXa7ZVs2/r5cbVoo4iOkGnqIpsdIE a6AY1UQtR9ICe0At6NR6NZ+PNeJ9HC8Zi5hj9gfH5DZaaoR4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jc/VDh6DsCj bTrJWZzG1hmWfunQ=">AAACG3icbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g61QNyXpRpdFNy4r2Ac 0NUymk3bo5MHMTaGE/Icbf8WNC0VcCS78G6dpBW09MHA451zu3OPFgiuwrC+jsLa+ sblV3C7t7O7tH5iHR20VJZKyFo1EJLseUUzwkLWAg2DdWDISeIJ1vPH1zO9MmFQ8Cu 9gGrN+QIYh9zkloCXXrFccwXyoYuxMiI4NA+KmPLtPnZxnjuTDEZxj90eolFyzbNW sHHiV2AtSRgs0XfPDGUQ0CVgIVBClerYVQz8lEjgVLCs5iWIxoWMyZD1NQxIw1U/z2 zJ8ppUB9iOpXwg4V39PpCRQahp4OhkQGKllbyb+5/US8C/7KQ/jBFhI54v8RGCI8K woPOCSURBTTQiVXP8V0xGRhIKuc1aCvXzyKmnXa7ZVs2/r5cbVoo4iOkGnqIpsdIE a6AY1UQtR9ICe0At6NR6NZ+PNeJ9HC8Zi5hj9gfH5DZaaoR4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jc/VDh6DsCj bTrJWZzG1hmWfunQ=">AAACG3icbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g61QNyXpRpdFNy4r2Ac 0NUymk3bo5MHMTaGE/Icbf8WNC0VcCS78G6dpBW09MHA451zu3OPFgiuwrC+jsLa+ sblV3C7t7O7tH5iHR20VJZKyFo1EJLseUUzwkLWAg2DdWDISeIJ1vPH1zO9MmFQ8Cu 9gGrN+QIYh9zkloCXXrFccwXyoYuxMiI4NA+KmPLtPnZxnjuTDEZxj90eolFyzbNW sHHiV2AtSRgs0XfPDGUQ0CVgIVBClerYVQz8lEjgVLCs5iWIxoWMyZD1NQxIw1U/z2 zJ8ppUB9iOpXwg4V39PpCRQahp4OhkQGKllbyb+5/US8C/7KQ/jBFhI54v8RGCI8K woPOCSURBTTQiVXP8V0xGRhIKuc1aCvXzyKmnXa7ZVs2/r5cbVoo4iOkGnqIpsdIE a6AY1UQtR9ICe0At6NR6NZ+PNeJ9HC8Zi5hj9gfH5DZaaoR4=</latexit>
⌧i
<latexit sha1_base64="SxpRtf0qFUBQwku+gjP/Ov+oD8c=">AAAB8nicbVBNT8 JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLI5h4Ii0XPRK9eMREwAQasl22sGG72+xOTUjDz/DiQWO8+mu8+W/cQg8KvmSSl/dmMjMvTAQ36HnfTmljc2t7p7xb2ds/ODyqHp90jUo1ZR2qhNKPITFMc Mk6yFGwx0QzEoeC9cLpbe73npg2XMkHnCUsiMlY8ohTglbq1wdI0mHG5/XKsFrzGt4C7jrxC1KDAu1h9WswUjSNmUQqiDF930swyIhGTgWbVwapYQmhUzJmfUsliZkJssXJ c/fCKiM3UtqWRHeh/p7ISGzMLA5tZ0xwYla9XPzP66cYXQcZl0mKTNLloigVLio3/98dcc0oipklhGpub3XphGhC0aaUh+CvvrxOus2G7zX8+2atdVPEUYYzOIdL8OEKWnA HbegABQXP8ApvDjovzrvzsWwtOcXMKfyB8/kDWA2Qng==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SxpRtf0qFUBQwku+gjP/Ov+oD8c=">AAAB8nicbVBNT8 JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLI5h4Ii0XPRK9eMREwAQasl22sGG72+xOTUjDz/DiQWO8+mu8+W/cQg8KvmSSl/dmMjMvTAQ36HnfTmljc2t7p7xb2ds/ODyqHp90jUo1ZR2qhNKPITFMc Mk6yFGwx0QzEoeC9cLpbe73npg2XMkHnCUsiMlY8ohTglbq1wdI0mHG5/XKsFrzGt4C7jrxC1KDAu1h9WswUjSNmUQqiDF930swyIhGTgWbVwapYQmhUzJmfUsliZkJssXJ c/fCKiM3UtqWRHeh/p7ISGzMLA5tZ0xwYla9XPzP66cYXQcZl0mKTNLloigVLio3/98dcc0oipklhGpub3XphGhC0aaUh+CvvrxOus2G7zX8+2atdVPEUYYzOIdL8OEKWnA HbegABQXP8ApvDjovzrvzsWwtOcXMKfyB8/kDWA2Qng==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SxpRtf0qFUBQwku+gjP/Ov+oD8c=">AAAB8nicbVBNT8 JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLI5h4Ii0XPRK9eMREwAQasl22sGG72+xOTUjDz/DiQWO8+mu8+W/cQg8KvmSSl/dmMjMvTAQ36HnfTmljc2t7p7xb2ds/ODyqHp90jUo1ZR2qhNKPITFMc Mk6yFGwx0QzEoeC9cLpbe73npg2XMkHnCUsiMlY8ohTglbq1wdI0mHG5/XKsFrzGt4C7jrxC1KDAu1h9WswUjSNmUQqiDF930swyIhGTgWbVwapYQmhUzJmfUsliZkJssXJ c/fCKiM3UtqWRHeh/p7ISGzMLA5tZ0xwYla9XPzP66cYXQcZl0mKTNLloigVLio3/98dcc0oipklhGpub3XphGhC0aaUh+CvvrxOus2G7zX8+2atdVPEUYYzOIdL8OEKWnA HbegABQXP8ApvDjovzrvzsWwtOcXMKfyB8/kDWA2Qng==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SxpRtf0qFUBQwku+gjP/Ov+oD8c=">AAAB8nicbVBNT8 JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLI5h4Ii0XPRK9eMREwAQasl22sGG72+xOTUjDz/DiQWO8+mu8+W/cQg8KvmSSl/dmMjMvTAQ36HnfTmljc2t7p7xb2ds/ODyqHp90jUo1ZR2qhNKPITFMc Mk6yFGwx0QzEoeC9cLpbe73npg2XMkHnCUsiMlY8ohTglbq1wdI0mHG5/XKsFrzGt4C7jrxC1KDAu1h9WswUjSNmUQqiDF930swyIhGTgWbVwapYQmhUzJmfUsliZkJssXJ c/fCKiM3UtqWRHeh/p7ISGzMLA5tZ0xwYla9XPzP66cYXQcZl0mKTNLloigVLio3/98dcc0oipklhGpub3XphGhC0aaUh+CvvrxOus2G7zX8+2atdVPEUYYzOIdL8OEKWnA HbegABQXP8ApvDjovzrvzsWwtOcXMKfyB8/kDWA2Qng==</latexit>
gi
<latexit sha1_base64="1JWX/Q8H5+PS0LVAEjOE6GyF/qI=">AAAB73icbVA9Tw JBEJ3DL8Qv1NJmI5hYkTsaLYk2lpjIRwIXsrcMsGFv79zdMyEX/oSNhcbY+nfs/DfuwRUKvmSSl/dmMjMviAXXxnW/ncLG5tb2TnG3tLd/cHhUPj5p6yhRDFssEpHqBlSj4 BJbhhuB3VghDQOBnWB6m/mdJ1SaR/LBzGL0QzqWfMQZNVbqVseDlM+rpUG54tbcBcg68XJSgRzNQfmrP4xYEqI0TFCte54bGz+lynAmcF7qJxpjyqZ0jD1LJQ1R++ni3jm5 sMqQjCJlSxqyUH9PpDTUehYGtjOkZqJXvUz8z+slZnTtp1zGiUHJlotGiSAmItnzZMgVMiNmllCmuL2VsAlVlBkbURaCt/ryOmnXa55b8+7rlcZNHkcRzuAcLsGDK2jAHTS hBQwEPMMrvDmPzovz7nwsWwtOPnMKf+B8/gD7RY9B</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="1JWX/Q8H5+PS0LVAEjOE6GyF/qI=">AAAB73icbVA9Tw JBEJ3DL8Qv1NJmI5hYkTsaLYk2lpjIRwIXsrcMsGFv79zdMyEX/oSNhcbY+nfs/DfuwRUKvmSSl/dmMjMviAXXxnW/ncLG5tb2TnG3tLd/cHhUPj5p6yhRDFssEpHqBlSj4 BJbhhuB3VghDQOBnWB6m/mdJ1SaR/LBzGL0QzqWfMQZNVbqVseDlM+rpUG54tbcBcg68XJSgRzNQfmrP4xYEqI0TFCte54bGz+lynAmcF7qJxpjyqZ0jD1LJQ1R++ni3jm5 sMqQjCJlSxqyUH9PpDTUehYGtjOkZqJXvUz8z+slZnTtp1zGiUHJlotGiSAmItnzZMgVMiNmllCmuL2VsAlVlBkbURaCt/ryOmnXa55b8+7rlcZNHkcRzuAcLsGDK2jAHTS hBQwEPMMrvDmPzovz7nwsWwtOPnMKf+B8/gD7RY9B</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="1JWX/Q8H5+PS0LVAEjOE6GyF/qI=">AAAB73icbVA9Tw JBEJ3DL8Qv1NJmI5hYkTsaLYk2lpjIRwIXsrcMsGFv79zdMyEX/oSNhcbY+nfs/DfuwRUKvmSSl/dmMjMviAXXxnW/ncLG5tb2TnG3tLd/cHhUPj5p6yhRDFssEpHqBlSj4 BJbhhuB3VghDQOBnWB6m/mdJ1SaR/LBzGL0QzqWfMQZNVbqVseDlM+rpUG54tbcBcg68XJSgRzNQfmrP4xYEqI0TFCte54bGz+lynAmcF7qJxpjyqZ0jD1LJQ1R++ni3jm5 sMqQjCJlSxqyUH9PpDTUehYGtjOkZqJXvUz8z+slZnTtp1zGiUHJlotGiSAmItnzZMgVMiNmllCmuL2VsAlVlBkbURaCt/ryOmnXa55b8+7rlcZNHkcRzuAcLsGDK2jAHTS hBQwEPMMrvDmPzovz7nwsWwtOPnMKf+B8/gD7RY9B</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="1JWX/Q8H5+PS0LVAEjOE6GyF/qI=">AAAB73icbVA9Tw JBEJ3DL8Qv1NJmI5hYkTsaLYk2lpjIRwIXsrcMsGFv79zdMyEX/oSNhcbY+nfs/DfuwRUKvmSSl/dmMjMviAXXxnW/ncLG5tb2TnG3tLd/cHhUPj5p6yhRDFssEpHqBlSj4 BJbhhuB3VghDQOBnWB6m/mdJ1SaR/LBzGL0QzqWfMQZNVbqVseDlM+rpUG54tbcBcg68XJSgRzNQfmrP4xYEqI0TFCte54bGz+lynAmcF7qJxpjyqZ0jD1LJQ1R++ni3jm5 sMqQjCJlSxqyUH9PpDTUehYGtjOkZqJXvUz8z+slZnTtp1zGiUHJlotGiSAmItnzZMgVMiNmllCmuL2VsAlVlBkbURaCt/ryOmnXa55b8+7rlcZNHkcRzuAcLsGDK2jAHTS hBQwEPMMrvDmPzovz7nwsWwtOPnMKf+B8/gD7RY9B</latexit>
Time
<latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AAAB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3 iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhj N5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1+DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmo te9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wPn8ATMwjk M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AAAB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3 iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhj N5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1+DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmo te9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wPn8ATMwjk M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AAAB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3 iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhj N5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1+DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmo te9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wPn8ATMwjk M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AAAB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3 iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhj N5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1+DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmo te9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wPn8ATMwjk M=</latexit>
Period
<latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEN3 Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScih F05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmx Ez0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdLkozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOUV/4Hz+AP lCjz8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEN3 Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScih F05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmx Ez0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdLkozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOUV/4Hz+AP lCjz8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEN3 Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScih F05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmx Ez0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdLkozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOUV/4Hz+AP lCjz8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEN3 Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScih F05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmx Ez0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdLkozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOUV/4Hz+AP lCjz8=</latexit>
Time
<latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AA AB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z 3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhjN5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1 +DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmote9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+ KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wP n8ATMwjkM=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AA AB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z 3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhjN5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1 +DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmote9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+ KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wP n8ATMwjkM=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AA AB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z 3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhjN5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1 +DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmote9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+ KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wP n8ATMwjkM=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="gqCCggm9VA5XcP0AimIWmcWvf50=">AA AB7HicbVBNT8JAEJ3iF+IX6tFLIzHxRFoueiR68YgJBRJoyHaZwobdbbO7NSENv8GLB43x6g/y5r9xgR4UfMkkL+/NZGZelHKmjed9O6Wt7Z 3dvfJ+5eDw6PikenrW0UmmKAY04YnqRUQjZxIDwwzHXqqQiIhjN5reL/zuEyrNEtk2sxRDQcaSxYwSY6WgzQRWhtWaV/eWcDeJX5AaFGgNq1 +DUUIzgdJQTrTu+15qwpwowyjHeWWQaUwJnZIx9i2VRKAO8+Wxc/fKKiM3TpQtadyl+nsiJ0LrmYhspyBmote9hfif189MfBvmTKaZQUlXi+ KMuyZxF5+7I6aQGj6zhFDF7K0unRBFqLH5LELw11/eJJ1G3ffq/mOj1rwr4ijDBVzCNfhwA014gBYEQIHBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi1lpxi5hz+wP n8ATMwjkM=</latexit>
Period
<latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AA AB73icbVBNS8NAEN3Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza 3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScihF05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI 9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmxEz0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdL kozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOU V/4Hz+APlCjz8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AA AB73icbVBNS8NAEN3Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza 3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScihF05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI 9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmxEz0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdL kozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOU V/4Hz+APlCjz8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AA AB73icbVBNS8NAEN3Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza 3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScihF05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI 9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmxEz0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdL kozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOU V/4Hz+APlCjz8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rAzBn6PQ5SUkaSHqSR7ulmlkKtI=">AA AB73icbVBNS8NAEN3Urxq/qh69LBbBU0l60WPRi8cK9gPaUDabSbt0sxt3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/jps1BWx8MPN6bYWZemHKmjed9O5WNza 3tnequu7d/cHhUOz7papkpCh0quVT9kGjgTEDHMMOhnyogScihF05vC7/3BEozKR7MLIUgIWPBYkaJsVK/DYrJyHVHtbrX8BbA68QvSR2VaI 9qX8NI0iwBYSgnWg98LzVBTpRhlMPcHWYaUkKnZAwDSwVJQAf54t45vrBKhGOpbAmDF+rviZwkWs+S0HYmxEz0qleI/3mDzMTXQc5EmhkQdL kozjg2EhfP44gpoIbPLCFUMXsrphOiCDU2oiIEf/XlddJtNnyv4d83662bMo4qOkPn6BL56Aq10B1qow6iiKNn9IrenEfnxXl3PpatFaecOU V/4Hz+APlCjz8=</latexit>
Subsidises
<latexit sha1_base64="Alc9JQmp6ZnYRZWe8 PYQjVnMyIw=">AAAB83icbVDJSgNBEK2JWxy3qEcvjUHwFGZy0WPQi8eIZoFkCD09NUmTnoVehBD yG148KOLVn/Hm39hJ5qCJDwoe71VRVS/MBVfa876d0sbm1vZOedfd2z84PKocn7RVZiTDFstEJrs hVSh4ii3NtcBuLpEmocBOOL6d+50nlIpn6aOe5BgkdJjymDOqrdR3H0yoeMQVKjKoVL2atwBZJ35B qlCgOah89aOMmQRTzQRVqud7uQ6mVGrOBM7cvlGYUzamQ+xZmtIEVTBd3DwjF1aJSJxJW6kmC/X3 xJQmSk2S0HYmVI/UqjcX//N6RsfXwZSnudGYsuWi2AiiMzIPgERcItNiYgllkttbCRtRSZm2Mbk2B H/15XXSrtd8r+bf16uNmyKOMpzBOVyCD1fQgDtoQgsY5PAMr/DmGOfFeXc+lq0lp5g5hT9wPn8AW i2ROA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Alc9JQmp6ZnYRZWe8 PYQjVnMyIw=">AAAB83icbVDJSgNBEK2JWxy3qEcvjUHwFGZy0WPQi8eIZoFkCD09NUmTnoVehBD yG148KOLVn/Hm39hJ5qCJDwoe71VRVS/MBVfa876d0sbm1vZOedfd2z84PKocn7RVZiTDFstEJrs hVSh4ii3NtcBuLpEmocBOOL6d+50nlIpn6aOe5BgkdJjymDOqrdR3H0yoeMQVKjKoVL2atwBZJ35B qlCgOah89aOMmQRTzQRVqud7uQ6mVGrOBM7cvlGYUzamQ+xZmtIEVTBd3DwjF1aJSJxJW6kmC/X3 xJQmSk2S0HYmVI/UqjcX//N6RsfXwZSnudGYsuWi2AiiMzIPgERcItNiYgllkttbCRtRSZm2Mbk2B H/15XXSrtd8r+bf16uNmyKOMpzBOVyCD1fQgDtoQgsY5PAMr/DmGOfFeXc+lq0lp5g5hT9wPn8AW i2ROA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Alc9JQmp6ZnYRZWe8 PYQjVnMyIw=">AAAB83icbVDJSgNBEK2JWxy3qEcvjUHwFGZy0WPQi8eIZoFkCD09NUmTnoVehBD yG148KOLVn/Hm39hJ5qCJDwoe71VRVS/MBVfa876d0sbm1vZOedfd2z84PKocn7RVZiTDFstEJrs hVSh4ii3NtcBuLpEmocBOOL6d+50nlIpn6aOe5BgkdJjymDOqrdR3H0yoeMQVKjKoVL2atwBZJ35B qlCgOah89aOMmQRTzQRVqud7uQ6mVGrOBM7cvlGYUzamQ+xZmtIEVTBd3DwjF1aJSJxJW6kmC/X3 xJQmSk2S0HYmVI/UqjcX//N6RsfXwZSnudGYsuWi2AiiMzIPgERcItNiYgllkttbCRtRSZm2Mbk2B H/15XXSrtd8r+bf16uNmyKOMpzBOVyCD1fQgDtoQgsY5PAMr/DmGOfFeXc+lq0lp5g5hT9wPn8AW i2ROA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Alc9JQmp6ZnYRZWe8 PYQjVnMyIw=">AAAB83icbVDJSgNBEK2JWxy3qEcvjUHwFGZy0WPQi8eIZoFkCD09NUmTnoVehBD yG148KOLVn/Hm39hJ5qCJDwoe71VRVS/MBVfa876d0sbm1vZOedfd2z84PKocn7RVZiTDFstEJrs hVSh4ii3NtcBuLpEmocBOOL6d+50nlIpn6aOe5BgkdJjymDOqrdR3H0yoeMQVKjKoVL2atwBZJ35B qlCgOah89aOMmQRTzQRVqud7uQ6mVGrOBM7cvlGYUzamQ+xZmtIEVTBd3DwjF1aJSJxJW6kmC/X3 xJQmSk2S0HYmVI/UqjcX//N6RsfXwZSnudGYsuWi2AiiMzIPgERcItNiYgllkttbCRtRSZm2Mbk2B H/15XXSrtd8r+bf16uNmyKOMpzBOVyCD1fQgDtoQgsY5PAMr/DmGOfFeXc+lq0lp5g5hT9wPn8AW i2ROA==</latexit>
Investment
<latexit sha1_base64="wfJr9FUi/O5aEDcSA A/9fISDgGc=">AAAB8nicbVC7TsMwFHV4lvAqMLJYVEhMVdIFxgoW2IpEH1IaVY7rtFYdO7JvKlV RP4OFAYRY+Ro2/ganzQAtR7J0dM498r0nSgU34Hnfzsbm1vbObmXP3T84PDqunpx2jMo0ZW2qhNK 9iBgmuGRt4CBYL9WMJJFg3WhyV/jdKdOGK/kEs5SFCRlJHnNKwEqB+yCnzEDCJAyqNa/uLYDXiV+S GirRGlS/+kNFsyJLBTEm8L0Uwpxo4FSwudvPDEsJnZARCyyVJGEmzBcrz/GlVYY4Vto+CXih/k7k JDFmlkR2MiEwNqteIf7nBRnEN2HOZZoBk3T5UZwJDAoX9+Mh14yCmFlCqOZ2V0zHRBMKtiXXluCvn rxOOo2679X9x0ateVvWUUHn6AJdIR9doya6Ry3URhQp9Ixe0ZsDzovz7nwsRzecMnOG/sD5/AEXW pEd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wfJr9FUi/O5aEDcSA A/9fISDgGc=">AAAB8nicbVC7TsMwFHV4lvAqMLJYVEhMVdIFxgoW2IpEH1IaVY7rtFYdO7JvKlV RP4OFAYRY+Ro2/ganzQAtR7J0dM498r0nSgU34Hnfzsbm1vbObmXP3T84PDqunpx2jMo0ZW2qhNK 9iBgmuGRt4CBYL9WMJJFg3WhyV/jdKdOGK/kEs5SFCRlJHnNKwEqB+yCnzEDCJAyqNa/uLYDXiV+S GirRGlS/+kNFsyJLBTEm8L0Uwpxo4FSwudvPDEsJnZARCyyVJGEmzBcrz/GlVYY4Vto+CXih/k7k JDFmlkR2MiEwNqteIf7nBRnEN2HOZZoBk3T5UZwJDAoX9+Mh14yCmFlCqOZ2V0zHRBMKtiXXluCvn rxOOo2679X9x0ateVvWUUHn6AJdIR9doya6Ry3URhQp9Ixe0ZsDzovz7nwsRzecMnOG/sD5/AEXW pEd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wfJr9FUi/O5aEDcSA A/9fISDgGc=">AAAB8nicbVC7TsMwFHV4lvAqMLJYVEhMVdIFxgoW2IpEH1IaVY7rtFYdO7JvKlV RP4OFAYRY+Ro2/ganzQAtR7J0dM498r0nSgU34Hnfzsbm1vbObmXP3T84PDqunpx2jMo0ZW2qhNK 9iBgmuGRt4CBYL9WMJJFg3WhyV/jdKdOGK/kEs5SFCRlJHnNKwEqB+yCnzEDCJAyqNa/uLYDXiV+S GirRGlS/+kNFsyJLBTEm8L0Uwpxo4FSwudvPDEsJnZARCyyVJGEmzBcrz/GlVYY4Vto+CXih/k7k JDFmlkR2MiEwNqteIf7nBRnEN2HOZZoBk3T5UZwJDAoX9+Mh14yCmFlCqOZ2V0zHRBMKtiXXluCvn rxOOo2679X9x0ateVvWUUHn6AJdIR9doya6Ry3URhQp9Ixe0ZsDzovz7nwsRzecMnOG/sD5/AEXW pEd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wfJr9FUi/O5aEDcSA A/9fISDgGc=">AAAB8nicbVC7TsMwFHV4lvAqMLJYVEhMVdIFxgoW2IpEH1IaVY7rtFYdO7JvKlV RP4OFAYRY+Ro2/ganzQAtR7J0dM498r0nSgU34Hnfzsbm1vbObmXP3T84PDqunpx2jMo0ZW2qhNK 9iBgmuGRt4CBYL9WMJJFg3WhyV/jdKdOGK/kEs5SFCRlJHnNKwEqB+yCnzEDCJAyqNa/uLYDXiV+S GirRGlS/+kNFsyJLBTEm8L0Uwpxo4FSwudvPDEsJnZARCyyVJGEmzBcrz/GlVYY4Vto+CXih/k7k JDFmlkR2MiEwNqteIf7nBRnEN2HOZZoBk3T5UZwJDAoX9+Mh14yCmFlCqOZ2V0zHRBMKtiXXluCvn rxOOo2679X9x0ateVvWUUHn6AJdIR9doya6Ry3URhQp9Ixe0ZsDzovz7nwsRzecMnOG/sD5/AEXW pEd</latexit> Emission
<latexit sha1_base64="ZDLEyRDKhOWYjuaxLE3pBYUihss=">AAAB8HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiCB4r2A9pQ9lsN+3S3U3Y3Qgl9Fd48aCIV3+ON/+NmzYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YcKZNp737ZQ2Nre2d8q77t7+weFR5fiko+NUEdomMY9VL8SaciZp2zDDaS9RFIuQ0244vcn97hNVmsXywc wSGgg8lixiBBsrPbq3guncHFaqXs1bAK0TvyBVKNAaVr4Go5ikgkpDONa673uJCTKsDCOczt1BqmmCyRSPad9SiQXVQbY4eI4urDJCUaxsSYMW6u+JDAutZyK0nQKbiV71cvE/r5+aqBFkTCapoZIsF0 UpRyZG+fdoxBQlhs8swUQxeysiE6wwMTYj14bgr768Tjr1mu/V/Pt6tXldxFGGMziHS/DhCppwBy1oAwEBz/AKb45yXpx352PZWnKKmVP4A+fzB2ljkCM=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZDLEyRDKhOWYjuaxLE3pBYUihss=">AAAB8HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiCB4r2A9pQ9lsN+3S3U3Y3Qgl9Fd48aCIV3+ON/+NmzYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YcKZNp737ZQ2Nre2d8q77t7+weFR5fiko+NUEdomMY9VL8SaciZp2zDDaS9RFIuQ0244vcn97hNVmsXywc wSGgg8lixiBBsrPbq3guncHFaqXs1bAK0TvyBVKNAaVr4Go5ikgkpDONa673uJCTKsDCOczt1BqmmCyRSPad9SiQXVQbY4eI4urDJCUaxsSYMW6u+JDAutZyK0nQKbiV71cvE/r5+aqBFkTCapoZIsF0 UpRyZG+fdoxBQlhs8swUQxeysiE6wwMTYj14bgr768Tjr1mu/V/Pt6tXldxFGGMziHS/DhCppwBy1oAwEBz/AKb45yXpx352PZWnKKmVP4A+fzB2ljkCM=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZDLEyRDKhOWYjuaxLE3pBYUihss=">AAAB8HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiCB4r2A9pQ9lsN+3S3U3Y3Qgl9Fd48aCIV3+ON/+NmzYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YcKZNp737ZQ2Nre2d8q77t7+weFR5fiko+NUEdomMY9VL8SaciZp2zDDaS9RFIuQ0244vcn97hNVmsXywc wSGgg8lixiBBsrPbq3guncHFaqXs1bAK0TvyBVKNAaVr4Go5ikgkpDONa673uJCTKsDCOczt1BqmmCyRSPad9SiQXVQbY4eI4urDJCUaxsSYMW6u+JDAutZyK0nQKbiV71cvE/r5+aqBFkTCapoZIsF0 UpRyZG+fdoxBQlhs8swUQxeysiE6wwMTYj14bgr768Tjr1mu/V/Pt6tXldxFGGMziHS/DhCppwBy1oAwEBz/AKb45yXpx352PZWnKKmVP4A+fzB2ljkCM=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZDLEyRDKhOWYjuaxLE3pBYUihss=">AAAB8HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiCB4r2A9pQ9lsN+3S3U3Y3Qgl9Fd48aCIV3+ON/+NmzYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YcKZNp737ZQ2Nre2d8q77t7+weFR5fiko+NUEdomMY9VL8SaciZp2zDDaS9RFIuQ0244vcn97hNVmsXywc wSGgg8lixiBBsrPbq3guncHFaqXs1bAK0TvyBVKNAaVr4Go5ikgkpDONa673uJCTKsDCOczt1BqmmCyRSPad9SiQXVQbY4eI4urDJCUaxsSYMW6u+JDAutZyK0nQKbiV71cvE/r5+aqBFkTCapoZIsF0 UpRyZG+fdoxBQlhs8swUQxeysiE6wwMTYj14bgr768Tjr1mu/V/Pt6tXldxFGGMziHS/DhCppwBy1oAwEBz/AKb45yXpx352PZWnKKmVP4A+fzB2ljkCM=</latexit>
Tax
<latexit sha1_base64="K6ljL3uFe2wDM79EO8kxmxcRp6M=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiF48V+gVtKJvtpl26uwm7G7GE/gUvHhTx6h/y5r9x0+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTDjTxvO+ndLW9s7uXnnfPTg8Oj6pnJ51dZwqQjsk5rHqh1hTziTtGGY47SeKYhFy2gtnd7nfe6RKs1i2zT yhgcATySJGsMklt42fRpWqV/OWQJvEL0gVCrRGla/hOCapoNIQjrUe+F5iggwrwwinC3eYappgMsMTOrBUYkF1kC1vXaArq4xRFCtb0qCl+nsiw0LruQhtp8Bmqte9XPzPG6QmagQZk0lqqCSrRVHKkY lR/jgaM0WJ4XNLMFHM3orIFCtMjI3HtSH46y9vkm695ns1/6Febd4WcZThAi7hGny4gSbcQws6QGAKz/AKb45wXpx352PVWnKKmXP4A+fzB3cMjdc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="K6ljL3uFe2wDM79EO8kxmxcRp6M=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiF48V+gVtKJvtpl26uwm7G7GE/gUvHhTx6h/y5r9x0+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTDjTxvO+ndLW9s7uXnnfPTg8Oj6pnJ51dZwqQjsk5rHqh1hTziTtGGY47SeKYhFy2gtnd7nfe6RKs1i2zT yhgcATySJGsMklt42fRpWqV/OWQJvEL0gVCrRGla/hOCapoNIQjrUe+F5iggwrwwinC3eYappgMsMTOrBUYkF1kC1vXaArq4xRFCtb0qCl+nsiw0LruQhtp8Bmqte9XPzPG6QmagQZk0lqqCSrRVHKkY lR/jgaM0WJ4XNLMFHM3orIFCtMjI3HtSH46y9vkm695ns1/6Febd4WcZThAi7hGny4gSbcQws6QGAKz/AKb45wXpx352PVWnKKmXP4A+fzB3cMjdc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="K6ljL3uFe2wDM79EO8kxmxcRp6M=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiF48V+gVtKJvtpl26uwm7G7GE/gUvHhTx6h/y5r9x0+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTDjTxvO+ndLW9s7uXnnfPTg8Oj6pnJ51dZwqQjsk5rHqh1hTziTtGGY47SeKYhFy2gtnd7nfe6RKs1i2zT yhgcATySJGsMklt42fRpWqV/OWQJvEL0gVCrRGla/hOCapoNIQjrUe+F5iggwrwwinC3eYappgMsMTOrBUYkF1kC1vXaArq4xRFCtb0qCl+nsiw0LruQhtp8Bmqte9XPzPG6QmagQZk0lqqCSrRVHKkY lR/jgaM0WJ4XNLMFHM3orIFCtMjI3HtSH46y9vkm695ns1/6Febd4WcZThAi7hGny4gSbcQws6QGAKz/AKb45wXpx352PVWnKKmXP4A+fzB3cMjdc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="K6ljL3uFe2wDM79EO8kxmxcRp6M=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Urxq/q h69LBbBU0l6sceiF48V+gVtKJvtpl26uwm7G7GE/gUvHhTx6h/y5r9x0+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTDjTxvO+ndLW9s7uXnnfPTg8Oj6pnJ51dZwqQjsk5rHqh1hTziTtGGY47SeKYhFy2gtnd7nfe6RKs1i2zT yhgcATySJGsMklt42fRpWqV/OWQJvEL0gVCrRGla/hOCapoNIQjrUe+F5iggwrwwinC3eYappgMsMTOrBUYkF1kC1vXaArq4xRFCtb0qCl+nsiw0LruQhtp8Bmqte9XPzPG6QmagQZk0lqqCSrRVHKkY lR/jgaM0WJ4XNLMFHM3orIFCtMjI3HtSH46y9vkm695ns1/6Febd4WcZThAi7hGny4gSbcQws6QGAKz/AKb45wXpx352PVWnKKmXP4A+fzB3cMjdc=</latexit>
Figure 3: Timing of the Policy Game.
We now consider the repeated game played by the n countries participating in an
international climate agreement. In accordance with the model described earlier, we here
define the best equilibrium as the Pareto-optimal SPE enforced by a trigger strategy in
which defection leads to BAU forever.28 Since countries are assumed to be homogenous,
it is natural to focus on the symmetric areto-optimal SPE, which supports (τi, (ς
σ
i )σ) =
(τ, (ςσ)σ) for each i.
As before, it is feasible to implement the first best as an SPE if the discount factor
is sufficiently large, i.e., if δ ≥ δ, where δ is derived in the Appendix. Since subsidies are
zero in the first-best policy, there are no gains from deviating at the investment policy
stage. At some lower discount factor, however, it will eventually be tempting to defect
at the emission-policy stage, since the high emission tax τ ∗ = nh is not optimal from a
national point of view. Thus, the compliance constraint at the emission-policy stage will
be the first to bind as the discount factor falls, as in the baseline model. At lower discount
factors, cooperation becomes more difficult and the equilibrium emission tax must also
be lower in order to mitigate a country’s temptation to defect. In addition, it becomes
optimal to impose positive investment subsidies on clean technology, i.e., ςC > 0, while
investments in brown technology should be taxed, i.e., ςB < 0. These policies reduce
the temptation to defect at the emission-policy stage, and thus the emission tax can be
reduced by a smaller amount than if investments were unregulated. For a sufficiently
small discount factor, δ, there exists no policy that can satisfy all compliance constraints.
Proposition 9 There exists a best equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ and it supports
equilibrium policies satisfying τ + ςC − ςB = nh. For each i ∈ N ,
(i) when δ ≥ δ, τi = τ ∗ and ςσi = 0 for every σ;
28Infinite reversion to BAU is not the worst punishment when emission is non-binary: The minmax
strategy is that the punishing countries tax domestic emission even less than τ bau. We abstract from
this possibility for simplicity and to be consistent with the rest of the paper.
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Figure 4: When the discount factor falls and free riding becomes more tempting, the
emission tax must be reduced and both the investment subsidy for clean technology and
the investment tax for brown technology must increase.
(ii) when δ ∈ [δ, δ), τi = τ ∗ − φ (δ), ςBi = − QD+Qφ (δ) and ςCi = DD+Qφ (δ) where:
φ (δ) = h (n− 1)
(
1− δ −
√
δ
(
δ +
(Q+ kB)D2 + (D + kC)Q2
(Q+ kB)DkC + (D + kC)QkB
))
with φ′δ (δ) < 0 and limδ→δ φ (δ) = 0.
Equilibrium environmental policies are drawn as functions of the discount factor in
Figure 4. A policy implication of the analysis is that emission taxes and investment sub-
sidies should be combined to ensure that the agreement is self-enforcing. In this context,
investment subsidies are not being used to correct a market failure or any externality in
the market of technology. In fact, if national governments were able to commit to reduce
emissions, an environmental agreement would have no reason to rely on investment sub-
sidies. Rather, the strategic role of investment subsidies becomes relevant when agreeing
on the first-best emission taxes is not credible.29
29Acemoglu et al. (2012) also suggest that a combination of investment subsidies and carbon taxes
may be necessary to successfully redirect technological change toward cleaner technologies. In contrast
to the current paper, the reason behind this result is purely technological and lies outside strategic
considerations.
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8 Technology and Pollution as Stocks
In this section, we reformulate the model to treat technology, as well as pollution, as
stocks. Suppose we let ri,t measure i’s technology stock at time t, where q
r
i ∈ [0, 1] is
the fraction of past technology that survives, i.e., that has not depreciated, into the next
period, and each unit of investment, Ii,t, costs k˜i. Clearly, deciding on Ii,t is equivalent
to deciding on ri,t once ri,t−1 is sunk. One benefit of investing today is that investments
can be reduced in the next period. Naturally, we can account for the future cost saving
already today:
With ri,t = q
r
i ri,t−1 + Ii,t, let ki ≡ k˜i (1− δqri )
be defined as the net cost of adding to the technology stock in period t, taking into
account the future cost saving. If the qri ’s were small, the above analysis would remain
unchanged since countries would need to invest in every period (even off the equilibrium
path) in order to maintain the technology level that is necessary to satisfy the compliance
constraint, and the net cost of investing would be equal to ki. Small q
r
i ’s are reasonable
in the very long-run context of climate change, in which countries must expect to invest
repeatedly, partly, for example, to maintain the infrastructure and the capacity to produce
renewable energy. If the qri ’s are instead large, then a country cannot easily reduce a clean
technology stock to rbaui after defecting and therefore defecting would be less attractive
than assumed above. In this case, an agreement is more likely to be self-enforcing because
of this irreversibility.
It is also straightforward to treat pollution as a stock. Suppose Gt is the pollution
stock at time t and it depreciates at the rate qg ∈ [0, 1], and let h˜i be environmental harm
to country i’s from each unit of Gt at each point in time. If h˜i is a constant, that is,
independent of the technology level, then:
With Gt = q
GGt−1 +
∑
j
gj,t, let hi ≡ h˜i/ (1− δqg)
be defined as the present discounted cost of emitting another unit, evaluated at the time of
the emission, while taking into account that it will depreciate only gradually. The present
discounted cost hi of every unit gi,t can be accounted for already at time t, allowing us
to represent i’s per-period payoff exactly as above.
In the case of both a technology stock and a pollution stock, the analysis continues to
hold since the stocks are not payoff relevant, that is, they do not influence the marginal
cost/benefit when deciding on ri,t or gi,t, and thus affect neither the equilibrium nor the
first-best ri,t’s or gi,t’s.
In fact, even with a convex investment-cost function for technology, the technology
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stock may be payoff irrelevant as long as it substitutes for emissions that have linear costs
(which is the case in Battaglini and Harstad, 2016, for example). If the cost of pollution
is nonlinear, then a larger pollution stock would reduce the temptation to pollute and
would raise the incentive to invest in clean technology (as in Harstad, 2012; 2016a). Since
these effects have already been analyzed in the literature, the contribution of our model
is best highlighted by abstracting from payoff-relevant stocks.
9 Conclusions and Climate Change
We examine a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with endogenous technology. We show
that players must invest strategically in various types of technologies in order for com-
pliance to be credible in the best equilibrium. Under imperfect monitoring, strategic
investments in technology can reduce the length or likelihood of punishment while still
motivating the players to comply. Technological spillovers facilitate technological trans-
fers, which may be necessary in order to motivate compliance when the players are het-
erogeneous.
The assumptions and extensions of the model are motivated by real-world interna-
tional climate change policies. Thus, countries invest in green and non-green technolo-
gies over time, and negotiations enable them to coordinate on the best self-enforcing
agreement. Furthermore, the global community is working to improve monitoring and
transparency, although IPRs and technology transfers remain contentious policy issues.
The analysis provides positive predictions as well as policy recommendations. In order
to motivate compliance with a climate treaty, it is necessary to ensure not only that the
decisions be repetitive and observable, but also that the number of participants be large.
In addition, countries must invest sufficiently in green technology. The leading climate
agreement to date, the relatively unsuccessful Kyoto Protocol of 1997, does not fulfill
these requirements. The Protocol specified emission caps for two subsequent commitment
periods and for relatively few (37) countries, without specifying investment targets. As
discussed in the Introduction, China and the European Union have nevertheless invested
substantially in environmentally friendly technology and, as predicted by our model, the
European Union has been complying to a large extent with the Protocol. Other countries,
such as Canada, were free to instead invest heavily in brown technology, and eventually
withdrew rather than comply.
Relatively successful climate policies are more in line with our policy recommenda-
tions. For example, the 2020 Climate & Energy Package adopted by the European Union
in December 2008 shares several features of the optimal self-enforcing treaty studied in
this paper. First, in addition to setting emission targets, the European agreement also
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required countries to increase renewable energy sources to at least one fifth of the total
energy mix by 2020. Second, the effectiveness of the European agreement can proba-
bly be attributed to the sequential nature of investment and emission decisions. While
member states were required to submit their national plans to meet the technology in-
vestment targets by 2010, they were required to limit their emissions to meet the annual
limit starting only from 2013.30 Having installed technologies before the actual emission
abatement, member states could then achieve enforcement by conditioning cooperation
on prior technology installation, as our theory suggests.
The European Union has political institutions that facilitate enforcement and pol-
icy commitments. It thus differs from the 2015 Paris Agreement, which nevertheless
vindicates the European approach by requiring countries to submit “their nationally de-
termined contributions [. . . ] at least 9 to 12 months in advance of the relevant meeting
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agree-
ment.”31 Many of the countries have pledged technology investment targets for renewable
energy, such as, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil, and the European Union, while Canada
and the United States have made promises to regulate brown investments.32 The Paris
Agreement is also more likely to succeed than the Kyoto Protocol was because it has a
larger number of participants, it resembles a repeated game due to its periodic pledge-
and-review mechanism, and it emphasizes transparency by requiring similar reporting
methods for all parties, components that are recommended by our theory in order to
achieve an optimal and self-enforcing agreement.33
30For further details on emissions targets, see ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/framework, and on
investment targets, see ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/national-action-plans.
31See article 25 of the 2015 Paris Agreement, retrieved from un-
fccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
32For further details on national climate plans, see cait.wri.org/indc/.
33For a comparison of the Paris Agreement with the Kyoto Protocol, see “The
Paris Agreement: A new framework for global climate action,” retrieved from eu-
roparl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573910/EPRS BRI(2016)573910 EN.pdf.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since ui,t (ri,t) is concave and single-peaked in ri,t, the best
equilibrium involving gi,t = g for each i ∈ N and every t ≥ 1 requires ri,t to be the closest
to r∗i , subject to compliance constraints at both the investment and the emission stages
being satisfied. Since deviations are never observed in equilibrium and the discount factor
is common to all countries, the best equilibrium simply requires ri,t = ri at every date
t. Hence, we can remove t superscript and solve at any fixed δ the following constrained
optimization problem:
max
ri
ui (ri) ≡ bi(g, ri)− hic (ri)ng − kiri s.t.,
ui (ri) ≥ ubaui , (CCri )
∆i (ri, δ) ≡ ui (ri)− ubaui −
1− δ
δ
(g − g)ψi (ri) ≥ 0, (CCgi )
where ψi (ri) ≡ ((bi (g, ri) − bi(g, ri))/(g − g)) − hic (ri). Since ui (ri) ≥ ubaui at r∗i , both
constraints hold if δ is close to 1. At r∗i , ui (ri) and condition (CC
r
i ) do not change when
δ falls, but (CCgi ) will eventually bind because ψi (ri) > 0 under Assumption 1. For
each i, a threshold δi is implicitly defined as the level of δ that solves ∆i (r
∗
i , δ) = 0.
Thus, if δ ≥ maxi δi, ri = r∗i satisfies conditions (CCri ) and (CCgi ) for all countries.
If δ < δi, condition (CC
g
i ) is violated at r
∗
i . However, compliance with low emissions
can be satisfied if ri = ri (δ) > r
∗
i for green technology, where ri (δ) maximizes ui (ri)
subject to ∆i (ri, δ) = 0, since ψ
′
i,r (ri) < 0. The opposite relation holds for non-green
technology, i.e., ri = ri (δ) < r
∗
i . As δ declines further, condition (CC
g
i ) is satisfied only if
the distortion |ri − r∗i | increases more. For each i, there exists a lower bound δi ∈
(
0, δi
)
,
such that if δ < δi, conditions (CC
r
i ) and (CC
g
i ) cannot be satisfied for any ri and no
SPE supporting gi = g for each i exists.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that, conditional on g, r∗i and r
bau
i are given by the
first-order condition (1). Differentiating such a condition w.r.t. g and ri, we get:
dri
dg
=
−b′′i,rg (g, ri) + hic′r (ri)n
b′′i,rr (g, ri)− hic′′rr (ri) gn
, (10)
where the denominator is the second-order condition of ui(ri) w.r.t. ri, which is negative.
Since g is discrete, we have:
r∗i − rbi =
∫ g
g
−b′′i,rg (g, ri) + hic′r (ri)n
b′′i,rr (g, ri)− hic′′rr (ri) gn
dg.
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Hence, r∗i − rbi > 0 if technology is clean, or negative otherwise. Furthermore, in the case
of adaptation technology, Eq. (10) simplifies to dri/dg = −c′r (ri) /(c′′rr (ri) g) and in turn
the term c (ri (g)) g is increasing in g if and only if c (ri) > (c
′
r (ri))
2 /c′′rr (ri). If δ < δi,
the best equilibrium satisfying gi = g for each i requires that ri = ri (δ), so that condition
(CCgi ) binds. Differentiating ∆i (ri, δ) ≡ ui (ri)−ubaui − 1−δδ (g−g)ψi (ri) = 0 w.r.t. ri yields
∆′i,r = u
′
i,r (ri)− 1−δδ (g−g)ψ′i,r (ri). For ri ' r∗i , we can then state the following results: (i)
since ∆′i,n = −hi(c (ri) g−c
(
rbaui
)
g) and ∆′i,h = −n(c (ri) g−c
(
rbaui
)
g)+ 1−δ
δ
(
g − g) c (ri),
dri/dn = −∆′i,n/∆′i,r and dri/dhi = −∆′i,h/∆′i,r are negative if technology is clean, and
positive otherwise (for the case of adaptation provided that c (ri) > (c
′
r (ri))
2 /c′′rr (ri));
and (ii) since ∆′i,k = −
(
ri − rbaui
)
, dri/dki = −∆′i,k/∆′i,r is positive if technology is of any
type.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ∆i (ri, δ) ≡ ui (ri) − ubaui − 1−δδ
(
g − g)ψi (ri) ≥ 0 with
ψi (ri) ≡ (bi(g, rBi , rCi ) − bi(g, rBi , rCi ))/(g − g) − hic
(
rAi
)
. For ri ' r∗, differentiating
∆i (ri, δ) = 0 w.r.t. r
σ
i for every σ ∈ {A,B,C} yields drCi /drBi = −b′′i,gB (·) /b′′i,gC (·) > 0,
drCi /dr
A
i = hic
′
A (·) /b′′i,gC (·) > 0, and drBi /drAi = hic′A (·) /b′′i,gB (·) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. To determine the best equilibrium in the presence of multiple
technologies, we must solve at any fixed δ the following constrained optimization problem:
max
ri
ui (ri) ≡ bi(g, rBi , rCi )− hic
(
rAi
)
ng −
∑
σ∈{A,B,C}
kσi r
σ
i s.t.,
ui (ri) ≥ ubaui , (CCrm)
∆i (ri, δ) ≡ ui (ri)− ubaui −
1− δ
δ
(g − g)ψi (ri) ≥ 0, (CCgm)
where ψi (ri) is reported in the proof of Proposition 3. Constraint (CC
g
m) necessarily
binds at the optimum. Hence, the first-order conditions can be written as:
hic
′
i,A
(
rAi
)
ng + kAi
hic′i,A(r
A
i )
− b
′
i,C(g, r
B
i , r
C
i )− kCi
b′′i,gC(r
B
i , r
C
i )
= 0, (11)
b′i,B(g, r
B
i , r
C
i )− kBi
b′′i,gB(r
B
i , r
C
i )
− b
′
i,C(g, r
B
i , r
C
i )− kCi
b′′i,gC(r
B
i , r
C
i )
= 0, (12)
with the second-order conditions being satisfied for u(ri) sufficiently concave. Let δi be
the level of δ solving ∆i (r
∗
i , δ) = 0, such that if δ ≥ δi, then ri = r∗i . If δ < δi, condition
(CCgm) is violated at r
∗
i and investments must be distorted from the first-best level to
satisfy the compliance constraint on emissions. Using Eqs. (CCgm), (11), and (12) and
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differentiating w.r.t. rσi for every σ ∈ {A,B,C} and δ for ri ' r∗, we obtain:
drAi
dδ
=
c′i,A (·)
ngc′′i,AA (·)
(
b′′i,BC (·)
b′′i,gC (·)
drBi
dδ
+
b′′i,CC (·)
b′′i,gC (·)
drCi
dδ
)
,
drBi
dδ
=
b′′i,CC (·) b′′i,gB (·)− b′′i,BC (·) b′′i,gC (·)
b′′i,BBb
′′
i,gC (·)− b′′i,BC (·) b′′i,gB (·)
drCi
dδ
,
drCi
dδ
=
ψi (·)
δ (1− δ) b′′i,gC (·)
− b
′′
i,gB (·)
b′′i,gC (·)
drBi
dδ
+
hic
′
i,A (·)
b′′i,gC (·)
drAi
dδ
.
Solving the above system of equations w.r.t. drσi /dδ for every σ ∈ {A,B,C}, yields:
drAi
dδ
=
c′i,A (·)
ngc′′i,AA (·)
b′′i,CC (·) b′′i,BB (·)−
(
b′′i,BC (·)
)2
Πi
,
drBi
dδ
=
b′′i,CC (·) b′′i,gB (·)− b′′i,BC (·) b′′i,gC (·)
Πi
,
drCi
dδ
=
ψi (·)
δ (1− δ)
b′′i,BB (·) b′′i,gC (·)− b′′i,BC (·) b′′i,gB (·)
Πi
.
where
Πi ≡ b′′i,BB (·) (b′′i,gC (·))2 − 2b′′i,BC (·) b′′i,gB (·) b′′i,gC (·) + b′′i,CC (·) (b′′i,gB (·))2
− hi(c
′
i,A)
2
c′′i,AAng
(b′′i,CC (·) b′′i,BB (·)− (b′′i,BC (·))2),
which is negative under the assumption (b′′i,BC (·))2 < b′′i,BB(·)b′′i,CC(·). Hence, if δ < δi,
drAi /dδ > 0, which implies that r
A
i < r
A∗
i . Furthermore, the following cases hold: (i) if
rBi and r
C
i are substitutes, i.e., b
′′
i,BC (·) ≤ 0, or weakly complements, i.e., b′′i,BC (·) ≤ ηιi (·)
for any ι ∈ {C-Di,B-Di}, drBi /dδ > 0 and drCi /dδ < 0, which implies that rBi < rB∗i and
rCi > r
C∗
i ; (ii) if r
B
i and r
C
i are strongly complements under (C-Di), i.e., b
′′
i,BC (·) > ηC-Di (·),
drBi /dδ < 0 and dr
C
i /dδ < 0, which implies that r
B
i > r
B∗
i and r
C
i > r
C∗
i , while under
(B-Di), i.e., b
′′
i,BC (·) > ηB-Di (·), drBi /dδ > 0 and drCi /dδ > 0, which implies that rBi < rB∗i
and rCi < r
C∗
i .
Proof of Proposition 5. To determine the best equilibrium in the presence of techno-
logical spillovers and homogenous countries, we must solve at any fixed δ the following
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constrained optimization problem:
max
z
u (z) ≡ b(g, z)− hc (z)ng − kz s.t.,
∆z (z, δ) ≡ u (z)− ubau − (1− δ) e (n− 1)
n (1− e)− 1k
(
z − zbau) ≥ 0, (CCze)
∆g (z, δ) ≡ u (z)− ubau − 1− δ
δ
(g − g)ψ (z) ≥ 0, (CCge)
where ψ (z) ≡ (b (g, z)−b(g, z))/(g−g)−hc (z) and zbau is determined from b′z
(
g, zbau
)−
hc′z
(
zbau
)
ng − (n − 1 − e)k/(n(1 − e) − 1) = 0. The thresholds δz ≡ 1 − ((n (1− e) −
1)/(e (n− 1) k(z∗ − zbau)))(u (z∗) − ubau) and δg ≡ (g − g)ψ (z∗) /((u (z∗) − ubau) +
(g − g)ψ (z∗)) are equal to the levels of δ implicitly defined from ∆z (z∗, δ) = 0 and
∆g (z∗, δ) = 0, respectively. Hence, if δ ≥ max
{
δ
g
, δ
z
}
, conditions (CCze) and (CC
g
e)
are satisfied for zi = z
∗ and the best equilibrium is first best. Let δ < max
{
δ
g
, δ
z
}
.
Note that constraint (CCze) can bind first only if z
∗ > zbau. Under this condition, since
dzbau/de = (k (n− 1)2 /(n(1 − e) − 1)2)/(b′′zz (g, z) − hc′zz (z)ng) < 0 and dubau/de =
(((n− 1) ke)/(n (1− e) − 1)) (dzbau/de) < 0, we have dδg/de < 0 and dδz/de > dδg/de,
which implies that there exists a threshold level e˜ > 0 implicitly defined from δ
z
= δ
g
,
such that δ
g ≥ (<) δz if e ≤ (>) e˜. Let e ≤ e˜ and δ ∈ [δz, δg). Then zi = zg (δ)
where zg (δ) is the level z that maximizes u (z) subject to ∆g (z, δ) = 0. For z ' z∗,
dzg/dδ ≈ ψ (z) /(δ (1− δ)ψ′z (z)), which implies that zg (δ) > z∗ if technology is green
and zg (δ) < z∗ otherwise. Let now e > e˜ and δ ∈ [δg, δz). Then zi = zz (δ) where zz (δ)
is the level z that maximizes u (z) subject to ∆z (z, δ) = 0. For z ' z∗, dzz/dδ ≈ z−zbau,
which implies that zz (δ) < z∗ if technology is of any type. Inspecting constraints (CCge)
and (CCze), it is easy to see that there exists a lower bound δ that is the largest level of δ
such that if δ < δ, there is no level of z that can simultaneously satisfy compliance with
investments and emissions, i.e., gi =g for each i cannot be enforced for any z.
Proof of Proposition 6. To determine the best equilibrium in the presence of techno-
logical spillovers and heterogenous countries, we must solve, for any fixed δ, the following
constrained optimization problem:
max
zi,z−i
ui (zi, z−i) ≡ bi
(
g, zi
)− hic (zi)ng − ki (n− 1− e) zi − ez−i
n (1− e)− 1 s.t.,
∆gi (zi, z−i, δ) ≡ u (zi, z−i)− ubaui −
1− δ
δ
(g − g)ψi (zi) ≥ 0,
∆zi (zi, z−i, δ) ≡ ui (zi, z−i)− ubaui − (1− δ)
e
n (1− e)− 1ki
(
z−i − zbau−i
) ≥ 0,
where z−i ≡
∑
j 6=i zj and ψi (zi) is defined in the proof of Proposition 5. Let i be the coun-
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try with the largest δi. Suppose e = 0 and δ = δi, and let ẑi (0) be the investment level
that is satisfying with equality both compliance constraints for i. Then, there is an SPE in
which every country invests ẑi (0) and all compliance constraints are satisfied. Next, con-
sider the situation in which e > 0. When everyone continues to invest ẑi (0), ui (zi, z−i) is
invariant in e, ubaui decreases in e, and thus both ∆
g
i (zi, z−i, δ) and ∆
z
i (zi, z−i, δ) decrease
in e. Obviously, the magnitude of these shifts is independent of θ, where θ is defined in
the main text. For some θ > 0, country j can choose zj = ẑi (0) + θ and still satisfy j’s
compliance constraints. Thus, consider the SPE in which zj = ẑi (0) + θ, while everyone
else invests ẑi (0). The larger zj benefits i. This is because ui (zi, z−i) and ∆
g
i (zi, z−i, δ)
increase by θkie/ [n (1− e)− 1], while ∆zi (zi, z−i, δ) increases by θδkie/ [n (1− e)− 1],
according to the formulas above. Consequently, for a sufficiently large θ, the positive ef-
fects on ∆gi (zi, z−i, δ) and ∆
z
i (zi, z−i, δ) are larger than the direct negative effect following
an increase in e. For such a large θ, when zj decreases by θ, both compliance constraints
of the most reluctant country become nonbinding, i.e., δi declines.
Proof of Proposition 7. To determine the best equilibrium in the presence of imperfect
monitoring for given probabilities p and q, we must solve at any fixed δ the following
constrained optimization problem:
max
r
u (r) ≡ b(g, r)− hc (r)ng − kr + δ [(1− q)ω (r) + qω (r)] s.t.,
u (r) ≥ b (g, r)− hc (r) (n− 1)g − hc (r) g − kr + δ [(1− p)ω (r) + pω (r)] , (CCgc)
where ω (r) = u (r) ≥ ubau and ω (r) ≥ ubau. Constraint (CCgc) necessarily binds at
the optimum, which implies that the intertemporal utility can be written as u (r) ≡
b(g, r)− hc (r)ng − kr− (q/(p− q))(g − g)ψ (r), where ψ (r) is reported in the text. Let
r˜ be the level of r that solves the following first-order condition:
b′r(g, r)− hc′r(r)ng − k −
q
p− q (g¯ − g)ψ
′
r (r) = 0, (13)
where the second-order condition is satisfied for b(g, r) − hc(r)ng sufficiently concave in
r. Replacing ω (r˜) with u (r˜) into condition (CCgc) satisfied with equality, yields:
ω (r˜) = u (r˜)− (1− δ)
δ (p− q)(g − g)ψ (r˜) , (14)
which is feasible if it is at least equal to ubau. Let δ be the level of δ that solves ω (r˜) = ubau
and consider the following two cases.
(i) If δ ≥ δ, then ω (r˜) ≥ ubau and r = r˜. Differentiating Eq. (13) with respect to r
and q, we get dr/dq ≈ −(p(g − g)/ (p− q)2)ψ′r (r), which is positive and implies r˜ >
38
r∗ for green technologies. The opposite relation holds for non-green technologies, i.e.,
r˜ < r∗. Combining ω (r˜) = δTu (r˜) +
(
1− δT )ubau with Eq. (14), the optimal length of
punishment T (δ) is determined from the following equation:
u (r˜)− ubau − (1− δ)
δ (1− δT ) (p− q)(g − g)ψ (r˜) = 0. (15)
Differentiating Eq. (15) w.r.t. T and δ, we get dT/dδ = ((1− δT )− (1− δ)TδT )/(δ(1−
δ)δT ln δ) < 0.
(ii) If δ < δ, then ω (r˜) < ubau, which implies that the optimal investment r 6= r˜ is
obtained from constraint (CCgc) when T =∞ and in turn ω (r) = ubau, that is,
b(g, r)− hc(r)ng − kr − 1− δ (1− q)
δ (p− q) (g − g)ψ (r) = u
bau. (16)
Differentiating Eq. (16) w.r.t. r and δ, we get:
dr
dδ
= −
1
δ2(p−q)(g − g)ψ (r)
b′r(g, r)− hc′r(r)ng − k − 1−δ(1−q)δ(p−q) (g − g)ψ′r (r)
. (17)
For r ' r˜, using Eq. (13), the denominator of (17) is −((1 − δ)δ/(p − q))(g − g)ψ′r (r˜),
which is positive and implies r > r˜ > r∗ for green technologies. The opposite relation
holds for non-green technologies, i.e., r < r˜ < r∗. Inspecting condition (16), we find a
lower bound δ, such that if δ <δ, there exists no level of r that can satisfy such a condition
and less emissions by all countries cannot be enforced for any level of r.
Proof of Lemma 1. Continuation utilities ω (g, r) must maximize:
u (r)
1− δ = b(g, r)− hc(r)ng − kr +
δ
1− δ
∫
g
ω (g, r)φ(g|ng)dg, s.t.,
u (r)
1− δ ≥ b(g, r)− hc(r)((n− 1) g + g)− kr +
δ
1− δ
∫
g
ω (g, r)φ(g| (n− 1) g + g)dg, (18)
u (r) ≥ ω (g, r) ≥ ubau. (19)
Ignoring for a moment constraint (19) and letting ν be the multiplier associated with
(18), the first-order condition with respect to ω (g, r) is:∫
g
ω (g, r)
[
φ(g|ng)− νφ(g| (n− 1) g + g)] dg.
By the monotone likelihood ratio property and given that g is continuous, there is a unique
ĝ (r) for which
φ(ĝ(r)|ng)
φ(ĝ(r)|(n−1)g+g) = ν and such that if g > (<) ĝ (r) then
φ(g|ng)
φ(g|(n−1)g+g) < (>) ν.
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We can then conclude that we must have ω (g, r) = ubau for g ≥ ĝ (r) and ω (g, r) = u (r),
otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 8. To determine the best equilibrium in the presence of im-
perfect monitoring when ĝ is endogenously determined, we must solve the constrained
optimization problem reported in the proof of Proposition 7 for the levels ĝ and r, where
q = 1−Φ(ĝ−ng) and 1−p = Φ(ĝ− (n− 1) g−g). Using constraint (CCgc) and replacing
ω (r) = b(g, r)− hc(r)ng − kr − (q/(p− q))(g − g)ψ (r) and ω (r) = ubau, we get:
b(g, r)− hc(r)ng − kr − ubau − 1− δ (1− q)
δ (p− q) (g − g)ψ (r) ≥ 0. (20)
Differentiating Eq. (20) w.r.t. ĝ and δ, we have dĝ/dδ ≈ ∂[(1−δ+δq)/(δ(p−q))]/∂ĝ. Since
abandoning cooperation consists in emitting more rather than less, a tail test prescribes to
trigger a punishment when aggregate emissions fall in the upper tail of their distribution,
i.e., in the critical region [ĝ,∞). In such a region, the monotone likelihood ratio property
implies that dĝ/dδ > 0. Differentiating Eq. (20) w.r.t. ĝ and r, we have:
dĝ
dr
=
b′r
(
g, r
)− hc′r(r)ng − k − 1−δ+δqδ(p−q) (g − g)ψ′r (r)
∂
∂ĝ
[
1−δ+δq
δ(p−q)
] (
g − g)ψ (r) . (21)
Let r̂ be the level of r that solves the following first-order condition:
b′r
(
g, r
)− hc′r(r)ng − k = (g − g)(L (ĝ (r))ψ′r (r) + ψ (r)Lĝ (ĝ (r)) dĝ (r)dr
)
, (22)
where L (ĝ (r)) ≡ q/(p− q) with L′ĝ (ĝ (r)) < 0. Replacing Eq. (22) into Eq. (21), yields:
dĝ
dr
= − 1
p− q
ψ′r (r)
ψ (r)
(
∂
∂ĝ
[
1
p− q
])−1
,
with ∂ [1/(p− q)] /∂ĝ > 0 in the upper tail of the distribution of global emissions. If
technology is green, ψ′r(r̂) < 0 and dĝ (r) /dr > 0. Using Eq. (22), this implies that r̂ >
r˜ > r∗, where r˜ solves the first-order condition (13) reported in the proof of Proposition
7. If technology is non-green, the opposite relation holds, i.e., r̂ < r˜ < r∗. Inspecting
Eq. (20), there exists a lower bound δ, such that if δ <δ, less emissions by all countries
cannot be enforced for any r.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let rσ (ςσ) for every σ ∈ {B,C} and g(τ, rB(ςB), rC(ςC))
be the solutions of b′g(g, r
B, rC) = τ and b′σ(g, r
B, rC) = kσrσ − ςσ. To determine the
best equilibrium fiscal policy, we must solve at any fixed δ the following constrained
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optimization problem:
max
τ,(ςσ)σ
u (τ, (ςσ)σ) ≡ b (τ, (ςσ)σ)− hng (τ, (ςσ)σ)−
∑
σ∈{B,C}
kσ
2
(rσ(ςσ)σ)
2 s.t.,
u (τ, (ςσ)σ)
1− δ ≥ b(h, (ς
σ,bau)σ)− h (n− 1) g (h, (ςσ)σ)− hg(h, (ςσ,bau)σ) (23)
−
∑
σ∈{B,C}
kσ
2
(rσ((ςσ,bau)σ))
2 +
δubau
1− δ ,
u (τ, (ςσ)σ) ≥ 1− δ
δ
(g (h, (ςσ)σ)− g (τ, (ςσ)σ))ψ(τ, (ςσ)σ) + ubau, (24)
where ψ(τ, (ςσ)σ) ≡ b(h,(ς
σ)σ)−b(τ,(ςσ)σ)
g(h,(ςσ)σ)−g(τ,(ςσ)σ) − h. Using Eqs. (8) and (9), constraints (23) and
(24) can then be written respectively as:
∆ς (τ, (ςσ)σ , δ) ≡ u (τ, (ςσ)σ)−ubau−
(1− δ)h(n− 1) ((Q+ kB)DςC − (D + kC)QςB)
(Q+ kB)DkC + (D + kC)QkB
≥ 0,
(CCς)
and
∆τ (τ, (ςσ)σ , δ) ≡ u (τ, (ςσ)σ)− ubau −
1− δ
δ
(τ − h)2
2 (D +Q)
≥ 0. (CCτ )
Let δ be the level of δ implicitly defined from ∆ς (τ, (ςσ)σ , δ) = 0. For (τ, (ς
σ)σ) =
(τ ∗, (ςσ∗)σ), if constraint (CC
τ ) binds, condition (CCς) is satisfied. We can then determine
a threshold δ from ∆τ
(
τ ∗, (ςσ∗)σ , δ
)
= 0, such that if δ ≥ δ, the best equilibrium is
(τ, (ςσ)σ) = (τ
∗, (ςσ∗)σ). If δ < δ, condition (CC
τ ) binds and τ solves ∆τ (τ, (ςσ)σ , δ) = 0,
while ςB and ςC are simply the arg max of u(τ, (ςσ)σ), i.e., ς
B = (Q/(D + Q)) (τ − hn)
and ςC = (D/(D + Q)) (hn− τ). Replacing (ςσ)σ into constraint (CCτ ) satisfied with
equality and solving for τ , we obtain τ (δ) = hn− φ (δ), where
φ (δ) = h (n− 1)
(
1− δ −
√
δ
(
δ +
(Q+ kB)D2 + (D + kC)Q2
(Q+ kB)DkC + (D + kC)QkB
))
with φ′δ (δ) < 0 and limδ→δ φ (δ) = 0, which implies that equilibrium investment subsi-
dies/taxes can be written as ςB = −(Q/(D + Q)) (φ (δ)) and ςC = (D/(D + Q))φ (δ).
When δ falls, τ (δ) decreases, ςB (δ) decreases and ςC (δ) increases. This shift of policies
is allowed until the point at which condition (CCς) becomes binding and no (τ, (ςσ)σ) can
satisfy compliance constraints at both stages.
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